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UNIVERSITIES AS FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS:
SOME EASY ANSWERS AND HARD QUESTIONS
Paul Horwitz
First Amendment doctrine is caught between two competing impulses. On
the one hand, courts and scholars face what one might call the lure of
acontextuality. They seek a set of rules by which First Amendment law can
be understood as a purely, formally legal phenomenon, untainted by the brute
contingencies of the actual world. On the other hand, their efforts to construct
acontextual legal doctrine are regularly disturbed by particular facts and
contexts that fit poorly into existing doctrine. This tension between
acontextual doctrine and factual variation has led to an increasing sense that
First Amendment doctrine, in attempting to be pure and responsive at the
same time, has become incoherent.
This Article argues that one solution to this dilemma is to openly acknowledge,
and make room in First Amendment doctrine for, an understanding of the impor-
tance of various "First Amendment ins titutions"-institutions that play a significant
role in contributing to public discourse, and that are both institutionally distinct and
largely self-regulating according to a set of internally generated norms, practices,
and traditions. Under an institutional approach, these entities would enjoy
substantial autonomy to make decisions according to their own best sense of their
missions---as universities, the press, religious associations, libraries, and so on.
Universities are one especially strong example of a First Amendment institution.
In myriad ways, they play a special role in contributing to the broader world of social
discourse that we value under the First Amendment. Moreover, they are institutionally
distinct, bound by disciplinary constraints and governed by a host of norms and
practices that substitute for external regulatory forces while still protecting
fundamental speech values. Legal doctrine should recognize the special role played by
universities under the First Amendment by largely deferring to these institutions and
permitting them to govern themselves according to their own sense of academic
mission, without government interference.
* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. My thanks to the
organizers of the UCLA Law Review Symposium, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Law, for their kindness and hard work, and to the participants for their
insights on this and other articles. I also wish to thank the Notre Dame Law School for the
opportunity to present this Article there, and for its support of this project during a visiting
semester there in the spring of 2007. For individual comments and questions, thanks to Amy
Barrett, Peg Brinig, Doug Cassel, Fernand Dutile, Rick Garnett, Cheryl Harris, Cathleen
Kaveny, Michael Kirsch, Scott Moss, John Nagle, Patricia O'Hara, Matthew Riordan, John
Robinson, Bob Rodes, Jim Seckinger, Paul Secunda, and especially Kelly Horwitz.
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This Article lays out the arguments for a First Amendment institutional
approach to universities, and surveys some of the implications of that approach.
It also addresses some arguments that might be raised against this approach-that it
elides the public-private distinction, that it falls afoul of the principle that "more
speech is better," and that it improperly privileges universities as First Amendment
actors. These arguments ultimately turn out not to present significant obstacles to
the institutional project. But even for those who support such an approach,
harder questions remain and deserve to be confronted. In particular, this Article
asks how we should think about the proper scope and limits of universities' rights
as First Amendment institutions, finding that we should defer substantially to
universities provided that they act within the scope of proper academic decisions,
and that the question of what, precisely, constitutes an "academic decision"
should itself be approached deferentially. It also observes that, although educational
autonomy may generally serve academic freedom, the two concepts are not
identical. This Article concludes by applying the institutional approach to several
controversies involving the university, including the use of race-conscious
admissions programs, the Academic Bill of Rights movement in state and federal
legislatures, and the recent litigation concerning the Solomon Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Writing in these pages over a decade ago, Akhil Reed Amar and Neal
Kumar Katyal observed that in a recent spate of decisions addressing
affirmative action outside the academy, the U.S. Supreme Court had "said
a lot about contracting and rather little about education."' Amar and
Katyal urged the Court to remember that "[e]ducation is different,"
2 and that
this difference required the Court to treat affirmative action in higher
education differently than it had in government contracting.
Why this should be so was not entirely clear. Surely we can recognize
that education is of fundamental importance to our nation Yet the U.S.
Constitution itself is entirely silent as to education. Aside from some
awkwardly grounded private decisionmaking rights concerning parents'
rearing of their children,5 there is no fundamental federal
6 constitutional
right to a basic education,7 let alone a postsecondary education. Moreover,
the sweeping terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause certainly do not speak in different terms to government contractors
than they do to educators.
Nevertheless, Amar and Katyal were right: Education is different, at least
in the Court's view. Two recent cases reaffirm the Court's continuing willing-
ness to accord special status to public universities under the Constitution.
1. Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1746 (1996).
2. Id. at 1779.
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (suggesting that "[t]oday,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments," in light of
"the importance of education to our democratic society").
4. See, e.g., James W. Guthrie, American Education Reform: What Is Needed Is "National,"
Not Federal, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 125, 133 (1997) (noting that "education was not a principal
component" of the constitutional framing debates).
5. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (overturning a state compulsory
public education law); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning a state law
prohibiting teaching in any language other than English, on substantive due process grounds).
For an acknowledgement that these decisions are awkwardly grounded, see, for example, Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe theory of unenumerated
parental rights underlying these [decisions] has small claim to stare decisis protection."); Emily
Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 655-56 (2002) (noting that Meyer and Pierce offer an
"arguably shaky foundation" for constitutional claims of parental rights, but suggesting that the
Court's long reliance on this shaky foundation "is itself an odd testament to the doctrine's
strength"); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 535 (2000)
(noting "the hodge-podge character of the theoretical basis for the Court's original holdings in
Meyer and Pierce").
6. The situation is different under many state constitutions. See Anita F. Hill, A History
of Hollow Promises: How Choice Jurisprudence Fails to Achieve Educational Equality, 12 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 107, 126 (2006).
7. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1972).
Four years ago, in Grutter v. Bollinger,' the Court observed that universities
"occupy a special niche in [the] constitutional tradition of the First
Amendment," and thus are entitled to substantial "educational autonomy."9
The Court therefore was willing to give extra weight to the University of
Michigan Law School's claim that "student body diversity" is a compelling
state interest, one that was sufficiently strong to permit the law school to
administer a carefully tailored program of affirmative action in admissions.'0
Just last term, in Garcetti v. Ceballos," the Court held that public
employees enjoy no First Amendment protection when they "make
statements pursuant to their official duties."'2 In so ruling, however, Justice
Kennedy was careful to note that "[tihere is some argument that expression
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's
customary employee-speech jurisprudence."'3  The Court thus put to one
side any suggestion that the rule in Garcetti would apply in cases "involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching."'4  Although Garcetti is not
entirely reassuring, the Court's apparent unwillingness to extend the rule in
that case to the academic context signals a continuing recognition that
something about universities demands a different approach to otherwise
generally applicable First Amendment principles.
In asking why this should be so-in asking why, exactly, courts should
treat a state actor who happens to be a university professor or administrator
any differently than they treat a state actor who happens to be a govern-
ment contractor or a public employee-two separate but closely related
factors spring to mind. First, courts have long recognized the importance of
academic freedom in the university setting. Since at least 1957,1" the
Supreme Court has treated academic freedom as "a special concern of the
First Amendment."' 6  To be sure, the contours of this apparent First
Amendment right of academic freedom are unclear, 7 and the Court is
8. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
9. Id. at 329.
10. Id. at 325.
11. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
12. Id. at 1960.
13. Id. at 1962.
14. Id.
15. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("The essentiality of freedom
in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident.").
16. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
17. See, e.g., FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY (William W. Van Alstyne ed.,
1993); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J.
251 (1989); Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the Academic
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more likely to speak expansively about academic freedom in those cases in
which the right is not at issue. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the
"special niche"'8 occupied by universities in the First Amendment context
is closely related to courts' interest in protecting a general principle of
academic freedom.
There is another reason courts treat universities differently, however;
and although it is closely related to the academic freedom justification for
treating universities as special creatures under the First Amendment and
can be easily mistaken for it, it is not quite the same thing. That is the
principle of deference. As J. Peter Byrne, the preeminent legal scholar on
academic freedom, has written, there is a long tradition in American law of
judicial abstention in favor of university decisionmaking.'9 That early doctrine
of abstention has effectively been absorbed into the constitutional
doctrine of academic freedom in the form of a general principle of deference
to academic decisionmaking. Thus, in Grutter, Justice O'Connor, noting
the "complex educational judgments" involved in admissions decisions, an
area she said "lies primarily within the expertise of the university,"
2 pointed
to the Court's purported "tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits."'"
In a number of other cases, the Court has emphasized the deference
courts must pay to the "genuinely academic decisions" of university officials."
This deference is owed, according to the Court, because courts are ill-
equipped to deal with "the multitude of academic decisions that are made
daily by faculty members of public educational institutions--decisions that
require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily
adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.'
' .
Thus, although academic freedom justifications for judicial deference to
universities may overlap with expertise-based justifications for judicial
deference (after all, who is more of an expert on the subject of academic
freedom than an academic?), they are not necessarily the same.
In this Article, I explore some questions about why courts should defer
substantially to universities across a broad range of issues, and how they
Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955, 956 (2006) ("[Tihe law of constitutional academic
freedom has not been fully realized in either its theoretical or practical dimensions.").
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
19. Byrne, supra note 17, at 323- 27.
20. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
21. Id.
22. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); see also Bd. of Curators,
Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90-92 (1978).
23. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89-90).
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should do so. My goals might be characterized as both internal and external
in relation to the subject at hand. From an internal perspective, I show
that a number of objections that have been raised to a policy of general
deference to universities as autonomous decisionmaking institutions are not
as significant as some might think. At the same time, I also raise important
questions that even those who support a deferential approach to university
decisionmaking must seriously consider.
From an external perspective, I link the question of deference to
universities to a larger pattern of judicial deference to a variety of what I
call "First Amendment institutions." Although universities merit special
treatment under the First Amendment, they are not the only institutions
that deserve special care. Rather, a number of other institutions-the press,
religious associations, libraries, and others-"play a fundamental role in our
system of free speech,"24 and should enjoy substantial deference from courts
when they seek to govern their own affairs.
Part I of this Article lays out a description of and an argument for an
institutionally oriented approach to First Amendment law, with special
reference to universities. Part II examines some standard critiques of an
institutional or deferential approach to universities by courts, and concludes
that none of these arguments ultimately have much traction. In Part III, I
ask some harder questions about a deferential, institutionally oriented
approach to universities and other special creatures of the First
Amendment. I also address some of the most contentious issues currently
facing universities. In particular, I address the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR),25 which
rejected a set of arguments against the coerced presence of military recruiters on
law school campuses-arguments that ultimately were grounded on academic
freedom, even if the Court largely neglected that aspect of the case. And I
discuss scattered legislative efforts, both in the U.S. Congress and in the
states, to enforce what purports to be academic heterodoxy and academic
freedom through the so-called Academic Bill of Rights.
24. Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 589 (2005) [hereinafter
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment].
25. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1497 (2007)1502
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I. DEFERENCE AND THE ACADEMY: UNIVERSITIES
AS FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS
In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that the time has
come to rethink and refashion First Amendment doctrine.26 Those contribut-
ing to this literature have argued that First Amendment doctrine should
partially or wholly abandon the sort of top-down, institutionally agnostic
approach regularly favored by the Supreme Court27 in favor of a bottom-up,
institutionally sensitive approach that openly "takes First Amendment institu-
tions seriously."2  Like others, I have argued that "the Court ought to
26. The charter member of this school is surely Frederick Schauer, although other
significant contributions have been made by David Fagundes, Daniel Halberstam, Rick Hills, and
Mark Rosen. See, e.g., David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1637 (2006); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2003); Mark D. Rosen,
Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination of Tem Limits, Judicial Campaign
Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL. 223 (2005); Mark D. Rosen, The
Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005);
Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the
First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and
the First Amendment]; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Institutional First Amendment]; Frederick Schauer, Is There
a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006) [hereinafter Schauer, Academic Freedom].
I have made my own modest contributions to this literature. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's First
Amendment, supra note 24, at 563-88 (offering an approach to thinking about the Court's treatment
of First Amendment institutions, and applying that approach to universities); Paul Horwitz, "Or of
the [Blog," 11 NEXUS 45, 62 (2006) [hereinafter Horwitz, Blog] (discussing the press generally,
and blogs specifically, as First Amendment institutions); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Horwitz, Three Faces] (discussing the role
played by deference in the U.S. Supreme Court's Solomon Amendment decision, with a special
focus on the insights that an institutional First Amendment approach might have offered in
that case).
It should be noted that this literature was substantially prefigured by Robert Post. See, e.g.,
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
(1995); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1280-81 (1995)
("The Court must reshape its [First Amendment] doctrine so as to generate a perspicuous
understanding of the necessary material and normative dimensions of... [various] forms of social
order and of the relationship of speech to these values and dimensions."). Post's writing,
however, is at a somewhat more abstract remove from the body of institutionally oriented First
Amendment scholarship described above, and is less concerned with particular identifiable
First Amendment institutions than it is with "broader organizing principles for social discourse."
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 567 n.488; see also Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra, at 1273 n.88 (noting the relationship between
Post's work and the institutional First Amendment literature but drawing similar distinctions
between the two).
27. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 563-88.
28. Id. at 589.
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recognize the unique social role played by a variety of institutions," such as
universities, the press, religious associations, and libraries, "whose contributions
to public discourse play a fundamental role in our system of free speech." 9
Accordingly, courts should "defer[] to the practices of [these] particular
kinds of First Amendment actors,"3 in ways shaped by the norms and
practices of the institutions themselves.3 Although these ideas are sometimes
discernible within the existing body of First Amendment doctrine,32 this
literature would bring this approach to the fore, urging the Court to
"explicitly, transparently, and self-consciously"" adopt an institutional approach
to the First Amendment. Before I examine this approach, however, some
background is necessary.
A. The Lure of Acontextuality and the Gravitational Pull of Facts
When interpreting and implementing the First Amendment, as
elsewhere in constitutional law, judges have "a deeply felt desire ... to achieve
noninstrumental certainty in the law., 34 In other words, courts interpreting
the First Amendment seek a set of rules by which the law of the First Amendment
can be understood as a purely, formally legal phenomenon, untainted by the
brute contingencies of the actual world. "[A] battery of extraordinarily well-
entrenched views about the nature and function of law itself'" encourages
courts to think of their role as being one of resolving "matters of principle and
not of policy."36 In the First Amendment, courts seek to realize this goal by
viewing the law "through a lens of 'juridical categories,' which compress all
speakers and all factual questions, no matter how varied and complex, into
a series of purely legal classifications."" In short, the law of the First




30. Id. at 570.
31. See id. at 572-73.
32. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 569-71; Schauer,
Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26.
33. Horwitz, Blog, supra note 26, at 61.
34. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist's View of Constitutional Implementation and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 174 (2006).
35. Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra note 26, at 107-08.
36. Id. at 112.
37. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 564 (quoting Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra note 26, at 119). See generally Frederick Schauer, Prediction and
Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998).
38. Cf. Claire L'Heureux-Dube, It Takes a Vision: The Constitutionalization of Eqyality in Canada,
14 YALE JL & FEMINISM 363, 370 (2002) (noting "the notoriously disembodied and acontextual
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Signs of First Amendment law's urge toward acontextuality may be
found "throughout the congeries of rules and principles that govern the law
of the First Amendment."39 Consider the law governing the press under the
First Amendment. The Press Clause singles out the press as an institution
entitled to special protection under the umbrella of the First Amendment.'
And yet, with a few exceptions,' and in the teeth of the constitutional text
itself, the Supreme Court has largely rejected the view that the press enjoys
any special constitutional privileges above and beyond those available to
other speakers.42 The refusal to recognize any special press privileges was
largely motivated by the Court's concern that such a step would require
courts to consider who qualifies as a journalist, a factual question that raised
"practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order." Thus, the Court's
fear of context has led it to "render[ ] the Press Clause ... a virtual nullity.""
4
Similar observations could be drawn from a range of other areas of First
Amendment concern. Consider the law of free exercise of religion, in
which a narrow majority of the Court refused to grant religious claimants
special accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause when those
claimants challenged neutral laws of general applicability. 45 Raising concerns
similar to those it had noted with respect to the Press Clause, the Court
suggested that it was not competent to "weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs, 46 and argued that a
judicial-accommodation approach would necessarily confront courts with issues
not susceptible to resolution by "principle[s] of law or logic." 7 More generally,
world of law"). For more on the tension between the law's urge toward acontextuality and its need
to respond to facts and institutions on the ground, see Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 26.
39. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 564.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (Press Clause).
41. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 577, 592-93 (1983) (striking down a use tax on the cost of paper and ink products used in
the production of periodicals). See generally Jon Paul Dilts, The Press Clause and Press Behavior:
Revisiting the Implications of Citizenship, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 27 (2002) (listing other instances
in which the press appears to have been granted a preferred status under the U.S. Constitution).
42. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972); see also Horwitz, Blog, supra
note 26, at 46-47; David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L REV. 77, 118-19 (1975);
Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 605 (1979) ("No
Supreme Court decision has held or intimated that journalism has a preferred constitutional position.").
43. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704.
44. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 564-65; see also Schauer, Institutional
First Amendment, supra note 26, at 1257 ("[Eixisting First Amendment doctrine renders the Press Clause
redundant and thus irrelevant, with the institutional press being treated simply as another speaker.").
45. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 887.
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the Court's approach to religious freedom has focused less in recent years on
context-specific questions about the distinctive role of religious groups and
practices, and more on the application of the (seemingly) acontextual general
principle of formal neutrality."
More broadly still, one can discern the urge toward acontextuality in
the free speech doctrine of content neutrality.49 This doctrine holds that,
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter or its content.""° A law is content-based "if its application depends
on the message of the speech."'" By definition, this inquiry is insensitive to
the context of the speech. Unsurprisingly, then, it has been applied across the
gamut of human expression.52 Thus, the very essence of the content-
neutrality doctrine is the attempt to craft a neutral rule that applies across a
variety of instances of protected speech. This doctrine is generally
understood to be "the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's [contemporary]
First Amendment jurisprudence."" Or consider the doctrine governing
public fora, 4 under which we are led to believe that a simple taxonomical
sorting of the sites in which speech occurs will spit out a result in the case,
48. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 186-213 (2002); Kent Greenawalt, Quo
Vadis?: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323,
390 (noting a "movement [by the Court] away from robust interpretations of the Religion
Clauses, under which religion must be treated as special.... and toward principles of equal
treatment and legislative discretion"); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 498-544
(2004); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
505, 506-23 (1998).
49. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
50. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
51. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000).
52. See id. at 49-52. Erwin Chemerinsky has described the doctrine's application in a
variety of cases, including United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000) (signal bleed on cable television); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (nude
dancing); Board of Regents v. Southwordt, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (university student activity fees); and
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (abortion clinic protests).
53. Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 650 (2002); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 49 ("[llncreasingly in free speech law, the central inquiry is
whether the government action is content based or content neutral.").
54. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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regardless of whether the forum in question is a public street," an airport
terminal,56 or an internal mail system.57
In short, the law's urge toward acontextuality is evident throughout
First Amendment doctrine. The Court's approach to the First Amendment
has been "institutional[ly] agnostic[ ],,,8 with little evident "regard for the
identity of the speaker or the institutional environment in which the
speech occurs."59 As I have noted elsewhere, "[ilts general approach has been
one of generality and principle rather than specificity, narrowness, and
policy on the ground."'  The Court has strived ceaselessly to craft general
First Amendment rules that guide us in all situations, and has been as
relentless in rejecting the view that context matters, and that different rules
should apply in different situations.
If acontextuality has been the goal towards which the Court has been
striving, however, it has been equally clear that, as with Sisyphus and his
rock, it is one the Court can never hope to reach.
6' When confronted with
the impertinent realities of various cases, whether in the First Amendment or
elsewhere in constitutional interpretation, it turns out that, as Justice
O'Connor observed in Grutter v. Bollinger,62 context does matter.
63  And
when factual context meets acontextual doctrine, it is often doctrine that
gives way.
So we find that the Court, when asking whether Congress could
validly require federally funded public libraries to install filtering software
to block the receipt of obscene materials by library computer users, is
forced to conclude that the general principles of public forum doctrine "are
out of place in the context of this case,"' and that it must instead "examine
the role of libraries in our society., 65  Similarly, when faced with clear
violations of the principle of content neutrality, the Court found those
55. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
56. See, e.g., Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
58. Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra note 26,.at 120.
59. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26, at 1256.
60. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 564.
61. For a different literary metaphor that is, perhaps, less grim and more sublime than that
of Sisyphus, see John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH
LITERATURE 822, 822 (M.H. Abrams et al., eds., 5th ed. 1986) ("Bold Lover, never, never
canst thou kiss, / Though winning near the goal").
62. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
63. See id. at 327 ("Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause.").
64. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
65. Id. at 203.
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principles inapplicable where the government body in question was an arts-
funding body, which necessarily must make content-based distinctions.66
And, notwithstanding both the existing structure of public forum doctrine
and the Court's earlier view that it is impossible to define who is a journalist, 67
the Court held that a federally funded local broadcaster could exclude a
candidate from a political debate because it was acting as a journalist and
exercising editorial discretion.66
Grutter, too, is an example of this phenomenon. Although it was
technically a Fourteenth Amendment case, Grutter was sultantially underwritten
by the First Amendment. 69  The Court concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment law that served to resolve affirmative action disputes in a
variety of circumstances involving public contracting and employment"
was inadequate to address the issue of admissions decisions made by
universities, given the "complex educational judgments" involved and the
''special niche" occupied by universities in the "constitutional tradition" of
the First Amendment.'
This, in a nutshell, is the dilemma faced by courts as they shape the
law of the First Amendment. On the one hand, courts (and, often,
scholars72) feel compelled to strive to craft pure, formal legal doctrine. In Rick
Hills's evocative words, they feel "the call to hunt for the Snark of 'pure,'
noninstrumental constitutional'value."73 On the other, they are confronted
with brute facts that ill fit the hermetic doctrinal structure they have erected.
Caught between the lure of acontextuality and the competing
compulsion to achieve sound results in light of the factual variation and
institutional differentiation evident in the speakers whose cases they decide,
courts face a Hobson's choice. They can preserve the law's acontextuality
at the cost of sound outcomes, or they can bend and distort existing
66. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Amy Sabrin,
Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102
YALE L.J. 1209 (1993); see also Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra
note 26.
67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); see also Horwitz,
Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 570; Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 923.
69. See generally Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24.
70. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (hiring of minority
subcontractors in federally funded construction projects); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (same, at local level); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (preferential protection against layoffs of minority teachers in K-12 public education).
71. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
72. See generally Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998)
(remarking on this tendency).
73. Hills, supra note 34, at 174.
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doctrine, making it ever more complex, until the doctrine approaches
incoherence."4 Some have argued that First Amendment doctrine, warped
by the tension between doctrinal generality and factual specificity, has
already arrived at a state of incoherence." Courts thus desperately require
some vehicle to bring responsiveness into the law, 6 despite their urge toward
acontextuality and despite the institutional difficulties they face when
attempting to resolve the sorts of questions that arise when courts are
responsive to the facts.
When faced with this dilemma, one way courts resolve it is with
deference. When they defer, courts suspend their own judgment in favor
of the judgment of some other party-another branch of government," an80
administrative agency,78 a private institutional actor
7 9 or a quasi-public actor.
Deference thus requires that courts privilege a party's sense of the relevant facts,
and often of the law itself,8' over their own independent judgment of the case.
The relationship between the law's contextual dilemma and the
phenomenon of deference is a complex one, and I cannot deal with it at
74. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 566; Schauer,
Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26, at 1270-73.
75. See Post, supra note 26; see also Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
supra note 26, at 86-87 (noting "an intractable tension between free speech theory [in general]
and judicial methodology [in particular cases]" and suggesting that "[i]f freedom of speech.. . is
largely centered on the policy question of institutional autonomy, but the Court's own
understanding of its role requires it to stay on the principle side of the policy/principle divide, then
the increasingly obvious phenomenon of institutional differentiation will prove progressively
more injurious to the Court's efforts to confront the full range of free speech issues").
76. Cf. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978) (defining and describing a regime of responsive justice).
77. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1172-81 (2003) (discussing the enrolled bill doctrine as a
form of "epistemic deference" granted by courts to the U.S. Congress).
78. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(requiring judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of law).
79. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (describing
"[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials" as "the exercise
of editorial control and judgment," entitled to substantial deference by courts and lawmakers);
Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 856 (1999)
(arguing that many courts, when examining the contours of constitutional protection for the
press in libel cases, carve out a space for deference to press decisions to publish by asking whether
the press actor was exercising "editorial judgment," defined as the "independent choice of
information and opinion of current value, directed to public need, and born of non-self-
interested purposes").
80. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (deferring to admissions
decisions by a state law school, not because of its status as a state actor, although it was this status
that triggered Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny in the first place, but because of its status as a university).
81. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
any length here.82 For now, it is enough to observe that there is an intimate
connection between these two legal phenomena. In deferring to other
actors, courts open up a space for shared legal and constitutional
interpretation by other actors who may be closer to the facts on the
ground. Deference thus allows courts to bring responsiveness into the law
by taking themselves out of the equation. By deferring-by permitting other
institutions, in effect, to shape both the facts and the law-courts offer
other institutions substantial autonomy to act in ways that may conform
poorly to the general doctrinal structures maintained by courts, but that
make complete sense in light of the needs and functions of particular
institutions and their superior ability to assess the relevant facts.
B. First Amendment Institutions
The role of deference as a response to the needs of particular institutions
brings us to the notion of what I, following scholars such as Frederick
Schauer, have called an institutional First Amendment. Rather than build
First Amendment doctrine from the top down, crafting general rules that
apply imperfectly across a range of situations, courts might begin with the
recognition that a "number of existing social institutions"-such as universities,
the press, religious associations, libraries, and perhaps others-"serve
functions that the First Amendment deems especially important.
Building on this foundation, courts could "construct First Amendment
doctrine in response to the actual functions and practices" of those
institutions that merit recognition as First Amendment institutions. 84
Under this approach, the Court would identify those institutions that
merit recognition as First Amendment institutions.s5 Those institutions
would then be granted significant presumptive autonomy to act, and courts
would defer substantially to actions taken by those institutions within their
respective spheres of autonomy. Courts might go further still by recognizing
instances in which the social value served by some First Amendment
82. For further discussion of this issue, see Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 26.
83. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26, at 1274.
84. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 569.
85. Even critics of an institutional First Amendment approach acknowledge that this call
for the identification of particular First Amendment institutions does not present an insuperable
obstacle to the project. See Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free
Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2005) ("[T]he fact that a First Amendment theory calls
for line drawing is not a sufficient objection to that theory. Line drawing is both inevitable and
desirable in First Amendment doctrine."); see also Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra
note 26, at 1260.
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institutions counsels privileges or immunities, such as some degree of
protection for reporters' ability to maintain the confidentiality of their
sources, that might not be available to other speakers.86 Courts might, in short,
value First Amendment institutions as institutions, according them substantial
autonomy to act within that institutional framework.
To argue for an institutional approach to the First Amendment is not
necessarily the equivalent of an argument in favor of absolute constitu-
tional immunity for First Amendment institutions. That a First Amendment
institution might have substantial autonomy to act does not mean it would
not be obliged to act within "constitutionally prescribed limits.""
7 Still,
this approach does entail granting a substantial degree of independence to
those institutions that play a substantial role in contributing to the world
of public discourse that the First Amendment aims to promote and
preserve. But my point is precisely that these institutions are already
substantially self-governing institutions. They observe a detailed and highly
constraining set of internal norms that govern the bounds of appropriate
behavior within those institutions. These internal norms can substitute for
the externally imposed, top-down model of judicial enforcement of standard
First Amendment rules.
An institutional approach thus suggests that courts should, in the first
instance, defer to those institutions' capacity for self-governance rather than
attempt to impose an ill-fitting doctrinal framework based on the idea that one
set of First Amendment rules can and should apply to the radically different
social institutions in which speech takes place. To the extent it is necessary to
build some set of constitutionally prescribed limits around the behavior of those
institutions, courts should build from the bottom up, taking their cue from the
norms and practices of the institution in question and from the social values
served by that institution. Thus, courts might ask of a First Amendment
institution's action in a particular case not whether it comports with some
universal First Amendment rule, but whether it falls within the boundaries of
behavior broadly consistent with the norms and practices of that institution,
and whether those norms and practices serve the First Amendment values that
are advanced by the role of that institution within the broader society."
86. See generally Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 571-74; Schauer,
Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26, at 1274-75.
87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
88. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 578-79 (suggesting that
courts "lay down a general procedural requirement-for example, is this a legitimate academic
decision, or is this task properly within the role of a library, or is this an exercise of professional
journalistic discretion?-while permitting the institutions substantial latitude to operate within
these minimal standards").
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A First Amendment doctrine built from the ground up around the values
and practices of existing First Amendment institutions has a number of
qualities that ought to be normatively attractive. It offers a way of thinking
about the First Amendment that responds to the differentiation that is
apparent in the real world between different kinds of speech institutions-the
different contexts in which speech occurs, the internalized norms of behavior
that constrain the speakers in each institution, and the social values served by
the kinds of speech that are central to different kinds of institutions. 9 It is
far more attuned to the actual speech-oriented social practices the First
Amendment serves to promote. Thus, an institutional approach avoids
the doctrinal incoherence that is inevitable when courts attempt to fashion a
First Amendment doctrine that tries, and fails, to apply to all kinds of
speakers and speech situations.
Moreover, because it is willing to engage in some institutional
differentiation rather than fashion generally applicable rules, the insti-
tutional approach to the First Amendment may be better suited to protecting
the full range of speech and speech-related activities engaged in by different
First Amendment institutions, and more conscious of the limits of those
institutions. In other words, it may avoid being either overprotective or
underprotective of any given institution.90 The law of reporters' privileges offers
one such example.9' Although many lower courts and state legislatures
protect reporters from divulging the identity of their sources, the Supreme
Court could not find a majority to firmly back this position, in part due to
the "practical and conceptual difficulties" inherent in the question of
whether particular "categories of newsmen.., qualified for the privilege." '92
This unwillingness to engage in any institutional differentiation between the
press and other speech institutions may result in a less vigorous protection
for newsgathering than is enjoyed in foreign legal systems, some of which
have found on both statutory and constitutional grounds that reporters are
entitled to such a privilege.93
89. Cf. Post, supra note 26, at 1280 (arguing that First Amendment doctrine should be
"refashion[ed] ... to foster a lucid comprehension of the constitutional values implicit in discrete
forms of social order").
90. See Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26, at 1270-73.
91. See id. at 1270-71; see also Horwitz, Blog, supra note 33, at 51-53.
92. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
93. See Floyd Abrams & Peter Hawkes, Protection of Journalists' Sources Under Foreign and
Internationa Law, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR., BULLETIN: WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
183 (2004), available at http://www.medialaw.orgrTemplate.cfm.Section=BulletinArchive&Template=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=2037.
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C. Universities as First Amendment Institutions
Universities are an obvious candidate for an institutional approach to
the First Amendment. This is true for a variety of legal and nonlegal
reasons, both descriptive and normative. Practically speaking, courts have
already accepted that universities play a distinct role in our First
Amendment firmament. The United States Reports are replete with
examples of the Supreme Court extolling the unique, and uniquely important,
role played by universities in the accumulation and advancement of
knowledge94 and in contributing to public debate.95 To this day, the Court's
decisions continue to recognize the special role played by universities in
public discourse, and to tread lightly around any suggestion that general
rules that are otherwise applicable under standard First Amendment
doctrine would apply in the same way in the university context.96 Willie
Sutton famously (and, according to Sutton, apocryphally)97 observed that he
robbed banks "because that's where the money is." Similarly, we might
begin an exploration of an institutional approach to the First Amendment
with universities because the Court has already treated universities as
First Amendment institutions.
In nonlegal terms, treating universities as First Amendment institutions
makes sense because they are already, highly institutionally differentiated
creatures. However strong the textual arguments for treating the press as a First
Amendment institution might be,9" doing so nevertheless begs the vexing
question of what, exactly, constitutes "the press."99  In the common run of
cases, universities pose no such definitional problems. An individual
94. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (relating academic
freedom to the role of universities in making "new discoveries" in various fields of knowledge).
95. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
96. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) (declining, without
deciding, to apply a general rule involving government employees in cases "involving speech
related to scholarship or teaching"); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (suggesting that
the Court's application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine might be different in cases
involving universities, which constitute "a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech within that
sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment").
97. WILLIE SUTTON WITH EDWARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY WAS 159 (1976).
98. See Horwitz, Blog, supra note 33, at 58.
99. See id. at 50-52. See generally Lange, supra note 42.
journalist, a blogger,re or a "lonely pamphleteer""°' may or may not be "the
press." But it is harder to pose as an entire university. To be sure, some such
questions of definition may arise on occasion; and one may fairly debate what
special features or qualities distinguish universities as institutions uniquely
deserving of First Amendment protection. Nevertheless, on the whole, it is
easy enough to recognize a university. We simply "know it when [we] see it."'0 2
There are also a host of normative reasons why we might value
universities as communities whose nature and whose contributions to public
discourse are so unique that they merit special institutional recognition.
Universities, at their best,0 3 are places of discovery, innovation, and
heterodoxy. They provide knowledge, debate, and a meaningful foundation to
the intellectual, professional, and civic life of students; resources, collegial
support, and a haven for the free and unfettered work for scholars; and
direct and indirect collateral benefits for the broader society. Academic
speech-again, at its best-is characterized by "its commitment to
truth... its honesty and carefulness, its richness of meaning, its doctrinal
freedom, and its invitation to criticism."" It can "provide[] our most
important model of expression that is meaningful as well as free, coherent yet
diverse, critical and inspirational."'0 ' These are virtues well worth protecting.
Perhaps as important, for institutional purposes, is the fact that the
university is also a highly disciplined environment.' 6  In a recent article,
Emily Calhoun observed that "faculty in our universities.., live their
professional lives within disciplinary constraints and norms."'0 7 Those
disciplinary constraints apply within specialized fields of knowledge, not
100. See generally Horwitz, Blog, supra note 33.
101. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
102. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
103. And they are not always at their best, as Larry Alexander reminds us. See Larry
Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883 (2006). Countless other writers have also
examined the failings of the modem American university. For a recent account of the university's
problems, one written with affection and sympathy, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF
KNOWLEDGE: SCHOLARS, STATUS, AND ACADEMIC CULTURE (2006). For more perfervid
critiques, see, for example, ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS, REVISED: How POLITICS HAS
CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION (1990); CHARLES J. SYKES, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND
THE DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988).
104. Byrne, supra note 17, at 259-60.
105. Id. at 261.
106. 1 mean that in the more literal sense of the word, as should be clear to anyone who has
spent much time on campus. For evidence, albeit of a fictionalized nature, that the university
could not possibly be said to be disciplined in the casual sense of the word, see, for example,
KINGSLEY AMIS, LUCKY JIM (1954); MICHAEL CHABON, WONDER BOYS (1995); DAVID
LODGE, CHANGING PLACES (1979); RICHARD RUSSO, STRAIGHT MAN (1997).
107. Emily M. Calhoun, Academic Freedom: Disciplinary Lessons From Hogwarts, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 843, 844 (2006).
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the university as a whole. Within each discipline, scholars operate according
to a set of finely detailed, widely shared standards, methodologies, and
norms. Only by traversing the entry barriers set by each discipline does
each scholar attain meaningful membership in his or her field, and only by
satisfying his or her peers within the discipline does the scholar attain or
maintain a reputation as someone worth listening to. To be fully accepted
within a discipline, a scholar must ultimately "be certified by her peers as
competent to engage in scholarly exchange.""1 8  Indeed, academic tenure
within the university generally has far more to do with the scholar's
acceptance by his or her own discipline than it has to do with any decisions
made by the provost, president, or any other corporate representative of the
university as a whole.'09 Thus, the scholar's life is a life of disciplinarity,
one every bit as finely grained, closely monitored, and ritualized as the
most exquisite tea ceremony.110
To this set of disciplinary constraints, we might add general scholarly
standards that apply across disciplines: norms against plagiarism and in
favor of proper attribution, norms in favor of peer review,"' and so on.
Finally, we might add the myriad bureaucratic rules, processes, and layers of
decisions-the host of "structural mechanisms"' "-that characterize the life
of the university. Taken together, we might say that the scholar, and, by
extension, the broader university, is thrice constrained in his or her actions:
by disciplinary norms, by general scholarly norms, and by the governance
norms of the university itself. It is thus hardly surprising that an institution
such as the university, which is defined by a disciplined and well-regulated
production of speech and knowledge, might be marked for recognition as
an entity well suited for treatment as a First Amendment institution.
108. Byrne, supra note 17, at 258-59.
109. See id. at 266 (noting the general acceptance "of a crucial tenet that invigorates the
notion of academic freedom whether the professor is tenured or not: Judgments of scholarly and
teaching competence must ordinarily be made by peers. Judgments of hiring and firing are made
in the first instance by other faculty deemed capable of evaluating on appropriate academic
grounds the potential and accomplishment of the candidate"); Calhoun, supra note 107, at 851
("The university especially acquiesces in the influence of the discipline in its tenuring processes,
which rest heavily on a system of disciplinary peer review.").
110. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 258 ("Academic speech is rigidly formalistic.").
111. With the notable, and perhaps unique, exception of that odd creature within the
modern academy: the American law review.
112. Byrne, supra note 17, at 267.
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D. Three Versions of the Treatment of Universities
as First Amendment Institutions
We come, then, to the crucial question of what the treatment of
universities as First Amendment institutions entails. Here, we can describe
three possible paths for the institutional First Amendment treatment of
universities: a weak-form treatment of universities as First Amendment
institutions, a medium-form treatment, and a strong-form vision of the
university as a First Amendment institution.
The weak-form version of the university as a First Amendment
institution should be familiar enough. Under the weak-form approach,
the university would be treated as a generally favored institution under First
Amendment law and perhaps in other areas of constitutional law. More
generally, it would be treated as an especially expert institution, one whose
relative superiority in administering its own affairs would counsel a fair
degree of deference on the part of courts dealing with disputes involving
core academic functions. This degree of deference would often serve to
insulate the university from legal claims challenging its decisions in academic
areas, but would hardly amount to immunity from most generally
applicable laws. Such an approach would not, however, provide additional
positive privileges to the university not enjoyed by other institutions,
beyond the advantage of deference itself.
Whether or not courts would label it as an institutional First
Amendment approach, this is, in fact, fairly close to the law as it currently
stands. There is little doubt that universities, as institutions, are special
creatures of the First Amendment, and courts have repeatedly said so."'
That status has led courts to accord universities a substantial degree of
deference, at least where core academic decisions, such as whether to grant
or deny tenure to a professor or whether to discipline or expel a student, are
concerned."4 In other areas, courts treat the university's interest in academic
113. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
114. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) ("[Clourts have stressed
the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic judgments."); Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (deferring substantially to an academic
decision to dismiss a student where the university reasonably exercised professional judgment
according to "accepted academic norms"); Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2006)
("[T]he [Americans with Disabilities Act] does not require public schools and universities to
accommodate disabled students if the accommodation would substantially alter their programs or
lower academic standards, and courts give due deference to the judgment of education officials
on these matters."); Kobrin v. Univ. of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 704 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Courts
accord a high degree of deference to the judgment of university decisionmakers regarding
candidates' qualifications for academic positions."); Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana Coll. Ass'n,
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freedom, and its decisionmaking autonomy with respect to genuinely
academic decisions, not as an absolute right, in the sense of a trump over
other competing interests,"' but as a constitutional "interest" or "dimension,"
grounded in the First Amendment, that weighs heavily in the balance
against countervailing legal interests." 6 Such has been the case in the
university admissions cases, in which the universities' claimed interest in
classroom diversity was accepted as a compelling state interest but still
weighed against the competing constitutional interest in nondiscrimination.
Note that in those cases, the courts' acceptance of diversity as a compelling
interest was itself substantially underwritten by the courts' deference to the
universities' own academic judgment that diversity was an important factor
in shaping the face of the university class." 7
Finally, although courts currently defer to universities across a wide
variety of legal claims touching on academic decisions, they are loath to
convert this deference into a more positive privilege in which universities,
by virtue of their institutional status, enjoy special rights against generally
applicable laws not enjoyed by other institutions. Thus, in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC,"8 the Court rejected a university's claim to what it
deemed "an expanded right of academic freedom to protect confidential peer
review materials from disclosure"' -in effect, a new evidentiary privilege
for the university. Similarly, in Bob Jones University v. United States,2° the
Court held that a university that chooses to enforce a racially discriminatory
admissions policy enjoys no special right to retain access to tax-exempt
status under the tax code.'
If the current state of the law resembles something like the weak-form
treatment of universities as First Amendment institutions, it takes little
work to imagine a slightly stronger version of the institutional First Amendment
935 F.2d 974, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1991) (indicating that courts will defer substantially to university
tenure decisions); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cit. 1984) (same).
115. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977) (advancing
the concept of rights as trumps). For pertinent criticisms of the "rights as trumps" approach, see
Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1803, 1810-16 (1999).
116. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 921.
117. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-15.
118. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
119. Id. at 199.
120. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
121. Properly speaking, Bob Jones University v. United States was a Free Exercise Clause
case, not a Free Speech Clause case. Nevertheless, I do not doubt the Court would have reached
the same conclusion had the case been framed differently.
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treatment of universities. Under this medium-form approach, courts would,
as they do now, accord substantial deference to universities' academic
decisions. The key difference would be in the extent to which such deference
is explicitly based on the special institutional status of the university under
the First Amendment. This openly institutionally based judicial deference
to the determinations of universities would thus demarcate the university as
a substantially autonomous institution within the law. What is now often
little more than a rhetorical frill 2 would become a more concrete and
meaningful reality.
To be sure, even this form of First Amendment institutionalism would
be subject to limits. First, as the Court suggested in Grutter v. Bollinger,'23
protection for universities as First Amendment institutions would run up
against at least some "constitutionally prescribed limits,"'24 although this
language begs the question of what sorts of limits would apply, and how
much the Court would defer to the universities' own sense of those limits.
More importantly, perhaps, a proper regard for universities as First
Amendment institutions would lead courts to require those institutions to
operate within a sphere marked by the distinctive cultural and professional
norms and practices of the university itself."5 A university that operated in
defiance of its own norms would be entitled to little judicial deference.
Within the shelter of those institutional norms, however, the university
would be accorded substantial deference to operate as it thinks best. Thus,
under a medium-form treatment of universities as First Amendment
institutions, universities might well enjoy a fairly substantial positive privilege
to rebut government attempts to intrude upon their ability to shape their
own affairs.
Four examples help illustrate how such a medium-form treatment of
universities as First Amendment institutions might affect current law.
First, as Schauer writes, to the extent that an institutional approach to the First
Amendment suggests that "the autonomous decision making of academic
122. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real
About the 'Four Freedoms' of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 935 (2006) [hereinafter Byrne,
After Grutter] (noting the "rhetorical ambiguities in Grutter" that "raise doubts about the depth
of the Court's commitment to [the] principle" that universities' "core institutional choices are
protected by the First Amendment"); J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic
Freedom, 31 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 79, 118 n.69 (2004) [hereinafter Byrne, Threat] (noting that
"academic freedom cases often employ stirring rhetoric without deciding much" (citing Byrne,
supra note 17, at 257)).
123. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
124. Id. at 328.
125. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 572-73.
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institutions [genuinely] counts for something," then a court might recognize at
least a qualified privilege against the discovery of promotion and tenure
records, a privilege the Court refused to recognize in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC. 26  Second, a court that recognized a genuine right of institutional
autonomy for universities might give serious weight to that interest when
considering the government's attempt to link the receipt of federal funds
to the requirement that military recruiters be allowed on campus on equal
terms with other visitors. In Rumsfeld v. FAIR,'27 an eight-member Court
unanimously failed to give such arguments so much as the back of its hand.
Third, notwithstanding state constitutional law, a private university would
have far greater latitude to exclude unwanted speakers, at least where such
exclusion was the product of a meaningful decision by the university about
the nature of desirable speech on campus.'28 Finally, a stronger degree of
recognition of the institutional autonomy of the university might well
suggest that courts should reevaluate their blanket rejection of campus
speech codes grounded in the universities' own considered judgment of the
kinds of speech that do and do not contribute to the academic mission,
whether on public campuses or, under state law, even 
private ones.129
Finally, we could imagine a genuinely strong-form version of recognizing
universities as First Amendment institutions. At its core, this approach
shares with the weak-form and medium-form versions the same basic concept:
that universities should enjoy an institutional right "to make [their] own
academic decisions, even if those decisions might, when made by a public college
or university, constitute otherwise constitutionally problematic ... decisions."'
3
The difference, then, is primarily one of degree.
But differences of degree are not a little thing. Consider the potential
gulf between courts' relatively deferential treatment of decisionmaking by
other branches of government,"' and their conclusion in some areas that
126. Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 921-22.
127. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
128. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (holding under New Jersey constitutional
law that a nonmember of the university community was entitled to leaflet on the Princeton
University campus), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982);
see also Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 946 (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in Schmid).
129. See generally Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 503-11. See also Corry v.
Leland Stanford Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27. 1995), available at http://www.ithaca.eduL
faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm (invalidating Stanford University's campus speech code,
relying on a California law giving students at private universities the same free speech rights as
students at public universities).
130. Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 923-24.
131. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997).
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certain decisions by government are either beyond the scope of judicial
review altogether,'32 or are entitled to a level of deference that approaches
"de facto non-justiciability."'' A strongly protective treatment of universi-
ties as First Amendment institutions might approach such a level.
In effect, a strong-form version of universities as First Amendment
institutions would treat them as legally autonomous institutions, which
enjoy a First Amendment right to operate on a largely self-regulating basis
and outside of the supervision of external legal regimes. Deference, on this
view, would not be simply a matter of putting a thumb on the scale in favor
of universities on a case-by-case basis as disputes arise. Instead, it would
declare such disputes to be largely or completely beyond the jurisdiction of
courts altogether.'34 Thus, universities would enjoy near-absolute discretion
to self-regulate across a range of academic activities, from hiring and firing, to
the selection of campus speech codes or the restriction of religious speech, to the
composition of the student body based explicitly on considerations of race or
gender.' A decision like FAIR, allowing the government to place military
recruiters on university campuses as a condition of continued government
funding, might well turn out differently. And universities might claim
other privileges and immunities from generally applicable laws, as in their
claim to a privilege against disclosure in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.
Unlike the medium-form treatment of universities as First Amendment
institutions, in which some of these outcomes might also obtain, the strong-
form version would treat universities as presumptively autonomous
institutions under the law, rather than simply weigh their interests heavily
in the balance against competing government interests.
Put so starkly, the gap between where we are now and the strong-form
version of universities as First Amendment institutions may seem wide
indeed, if not unbridgeable. But that gap may seem less dramatic, and the
contours of such an approach might begin to take on a more discernible shape,
if we compare it to a similar legal doctrine that already exists in the law.
Consider the legal status of religious institutions. Under the church
autonomy doctrine, courts are prohibited from reviewing "internal church
disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity."'36
132. See, e.g., Adler & Dorf, supra note 77, at 1172-81.
133. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
"Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 819 (1988).
134. Cf. Hills, supra note 34, at 186-87.
135. See generally Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 503-46.
136. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cit. 2002)
(citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116-17 (1952)). For a useful discussion,
see Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59 (2006).
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In words similar to those I have used here in describing the strong-form
treatment of universities as First Amendment institutions, Carl Esbeck
describes the doctrine of church autonomy as a "recognition" that "the civil
courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of
religious organizations." '
That doctrine means, at the least, that courts refuse to "undertake to
resolve [religious] controversies" involving the disposition of church
property. 38 But the doctrine extends beyond that, into questions of the
application of civil rights law to churches as employers. By law, churches
already enjoy a substantial immunity from liability under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act "with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society 
of its activities."1 39
Under that provision, churches are still prohibited from discriminating on
the basis of other protected categories, such as race, color, national origin,
or sex." But courts have read the Constitution to require a still broader
scope of immunity for churches under civil rights law, concluding that
church autonomy "bars any inquiry into a religious organization's underlying
motivation for [a] contested employment decision" involving "who will
perform particular spiritual functions.. 1  This rule has been extended
beyond the core "minister-church relationship" '42 to such individuals as lay
teachers at parochial schools," secretaries,"' and church organists. 45 Churches
have, in short, been granted substantial immunity from the ordinary operation
of civil rights laws that regulate the day-to-day internal operations of
countless other institutions.
Now, that is far from a strong justification for a strong-form treatment
of universities as First Amendment institutions, at least as I have described
137. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1589.
138. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000).
140. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen'l Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th
Cir. 1985); Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3 (2002).
141. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cit. 2006).
142. Id. at 303.
143. See NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
144. See EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
145. See Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). But
see EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cit. 1980) (refusing to extend the exception to claims
involving nontheology faculty at a sectarian college).
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such a regime. First, the analogy might not hold. Religious institutions may
occupy a very different place in our constitutional order, thus requiring very
different treatment; few individuals would likely take the view that universities
occupy as central a place in their own lives as religious institutions do in the lives
of many. Moreover, the immunity of religious institutions is founded not just on
the distinctness of those entities, but also at least in part on the substantial degree to
which courts are incompetent to evaluate the relevant factors involving decisions
by religious organizations.'46 We might reach a different conclusion with respect
to courts' ability to evaluate claims made by universities. Furthermore, even if
the analogy does hold true, an analogy is not the same thing as a justification.
The ministerial exception has had its share of critics,'47 and drawing a likeness to
what is, for some, a disfavored doctrine will hardly satisfy those critics.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that the model of First Amendment
institutionalism I have previously championed"' does not go as far as the strong-
form version I have described here. Like the medium-form brand of institutionalism
I have described, rather than grant absolute immunity to First Amendment
institutions such as universities, it grants them autonomy only to the extent that
they observe "procedural and substantive requirements drawn from the norms
and practices of [those] institutions." '49 But my point here is a more modest one.
I wish simply to point out that even a strong-form treatment of universities as
First Amendment institutions is not as radical as one might think at first blush.
To summarize, I have thus far offered three different ways in which we
might treat universities as First Amendment institutions, ranging from a
relatively watered-down version to a fairly stringent version. Under the weakest
version, universities would simply be entitled to some measure of factual
deference. Under the strongest, they would be entitled to a substantial degree of
legal immunity. Somewhere in the middle, universities would be entitled to
substantial decisionmaking autonomy and legal immunity for actions falling
within "procedural and substantive requirements drawn from the norms
and practices of the institutions themselves."'50
146. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1232
n.46 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1964)).
147. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary
Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1049 (1996). Ira Lupu has since revised the views stated in his earlier article.
See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 90 n.177 (2002).
148. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 578-79.
149. Id. at 579.
150. Id. at 579-80.
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What these approaches all share is a rejection of institutional
agnosticism under the First Amendment. Each of them proceeds from the
position that universities are among those institutions that "play a
fundamental role in our system of free speech."'' Accordingly, courts "ought
to attend to the unique social practices of these institutions, allowing the
scope of [their] deference [to these institutions] to be guided over time by
the changing norms and values of those institutions."'' 2 This is at least
something of a departure from the Court's current approach, whose tendency
is to exhibit "[a] reluctance to make. . . distinctions" among speakers and
institutions under the First Amendment.'53 How much of a departure the
institutional approach is in fact, and what sorts of questions are raised by such
an approach, are matters I take up below.
II. EASY ANSWERS
Having set the scene, I want to consider some questions that arise
when we think of the First Amendment in institutional terms, and
particularly when we think of universities as First Amendment
institutions. Doubtless this discussion does not exhaust the questions we
might ask about an institutional approach.'54 Nevertheless, it will at least
cover some of the most obvious questions about the institutional approach.
As I make clear in this Part, some of the most obvious objections one
might raise to an institutional approach ultimately present little real
difficulty. In particular, I have already argued that, in many respects, the
weak-form version of the institutional approach I have outlined above differs
little from the law as it stands. 55 At the very least, it is not much of a
departure from what courts actually do in this area, no matter what
they may say. 5  Thus, I need not address further the objection that the
treatment of universities as First Amendment institutions represents a significant
departure from current First Amendment doctrine. In some ways, it might
151. Id. at 589.
152. Id.
153. Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1407, 1409 (2005).
154. For recent efforts to raise questions about the institutional approach to the First Amendment,
focusing on Schauer's work, see, for example, Carpenter, supra note 153; David McGowan, Approximately
Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416 (2005).
155. See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying text.
156. See Fagundes, supra note 26, at 1686 ("The Speech Clause itself may be object-
neutral, but our First Amendment jurisprudence is nevertheless premised on implicit status
distinctions among various speakers."); McGowan, supra note 154, at 1432 ("DJudges do pay
attention to institutions when engaging in free speech analysis, though the doctrine does not.").
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be, at least if one adopted a particularly strong version of the institutional
approach. In other ways, it simply represents what courts already do, and
the question is then merely one of whether courts should be more aboveboard
about doing so.
To the extent that one might raise more meaningful objections to the
institutional approach, I believe those arguments are weaker than their
proponents might suggest. That is not to say that the institutional
approach does not raise a number of far more difficult questions. Rather, it
is to suggest that the most difficult questions stem not from frontal assaults
on an institutional approach in general, but from questions of scope and
execution that those of us who already favor an institutional approach
must confront.'57 Although I thus believe that the following suite of
potential objections to the institutional approach is not sufficiently persuasive
to present a significant obstacle to First Amendment institutionalism, they
are still worthy of serious consideration.
A. The Public-Private Distinction
We might begin with a fairly obvious objection that any treatment of
universities as First Amendment institutions raises. Crafting a First
Amendment doctrine that treats universities as an undifferentiated insti-
tutional whole ignores "a crucial distinction" among them: "[Elach lies on a
different side of the public/private divide." '158 The First Amendment, like
much of the rest of the Constitution, erects a line between private actors
and state actors. How, then, does it make sense to insist on a doctrinal
focus that would treat, say, the (public) UCLA School of Law as the
constitutional equivalent of the (private) USC Gould School of Law?
Private universities are generally thought of as enjoying greater freedom
to regulate speech taking place on campus than are public universities." 9
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, I doubt that the distinction
between public and private universities is as great as this description of
current law may suggest. Much of the reason for this conclusion lies in state
law rather than federal constitutional law. First, under state constitutional
law, some courts have already erased some of the distinctions between
public and private universities. Most famously, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in the well-known case of State v. Schmid,'6° held that the New Jersey
157. See infra Part III.
158. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 583-84.
159. See id. at 584 n.554 (collecting sources).
160. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
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state constitution required Princeton University to permit a nonstudent leafletter
to distribute pamphlets on campus, holding that the state's free speech provision
reached "unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct on the part of private
entities that have otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge
the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of their
property." '' Although this is the minority position in the states, 62 New Jersey is
not the only state to so hold. 63  Other states have taken a similar approach
through legislation rather than constitutional law; Califomia law, for instance,
requires certain state educational institutions to provide speech rights to their
students that are equivalent to the rights they would enjoy under state or
federal constitutional law.' 64
These laws and rulings raise troubling questions of their own,' 65 and my own
view is that both public and private institutions should enjoy greater legal latitude
to shape their own student speech rules to fit their own sense of their academic
missions. My point here is simply to suggest that the legal divide between
public and private universities is not as great as one might initially assume.
State law also narrows the gap between public and private universities,
because many state constitutions already give their universities at least some form
of independent constitutional status. 66 Michigan, for example, gives the Board
of Regents of the University of Michigan the right of "general supervision of its
institution.''16  Again, this fact points to the view that the public-private
distinction is not as great as one might assume where universities are concerned.
More broadly, whatever views lawyers may have about the public-private
distinction, I do not doubt that most academics, and indeed just about everyone
else, share the general intuition that there is not much of a difference between
public and private universities on a day-to-day basis.' 6 And that is precisely the
point of the institutional approach: Universities share common institutional
161. Id. at 628.
162. See 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9-3(a) (3d ed. 2000).
163. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981) (applying a state free speech
provision to a private university).
164. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002).
165. See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (1998); see also
Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 946; Byrne, Threat, supra note 122, at 104 n.171.
166. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 585 n.563.
167. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
168. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99 Nw.
U. L. REV. 249, 285 (2004) (describing the competition between public and private universities as
one of "competition between government agencies staffed by self-perpetuating groups of life-
tenured professors on one side, and tax exempt, nonprofit, government-subsidized institutions
staffed by self-perpetuating groups of life-tenured professors on the other").
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features and processes that transcend their source of funding, and it makes
far more sense for the law to organize around these common institutional features
than it does for it to organize around their private or public status. The
UCLA School of Law and the USC School of Law, to take one example,
share far more in common across the public-private divide than the UCLA
School of Law shares, within the sphere of "state actors," with the California
Department of Transportation. As I have written elsewhere, "the most
salient consideration in these cases should be the nature of the institution
and its role in strengthening public discourse"'9-not its public or private status.
B. State Actors as First Amendment Speakers'70
A closely related question, drawing on but advancing the public-
private question, is whether it makes sense to think of First Amendment
institutions such as universities as enjoying constitutional rights if those institu-
tions are, in fact, state-funded. As J. Peter Byrne has written, "[a] state university
is a unique state entity in that it enjoys federal constitutional rights against
the state itself."'' This may be troubling for those who are willing to grant
students and faculty members rights against public universities, but who
believe that such universities enjoy no institutional rights against the
larger state of which they are a part. As the Sixth Circuit recently observed,
in yet another case addressing the use of race in admissions at the University
of Michigan, "[olne does not generally think of the First Amendment as
protecting the State from the people but the other way around-of the
Amendment protecting individuals from the State."'7
Under this conventional understanding of the legal status of state actors,
there is no doubt that recognizing public universities as First Amendment
institutions, with corresponding rights against the state, presents an awkward
169. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 588.
170. The title of this Subpart is taken from David Fagundes's valuable recent article of the
same name. See Fagundes, supra note 26.
171. Byrne, supra note 17, at 300.
172. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 247 (6th Cir. 2006);
see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943 n.25 (5th Cir. 1996). This is the position taken
by Paul Secunda in his contribution to this Symposium. See Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon
Amendment, Expressive Associations, and Public Employment, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1771
("[Tihe Bill of Rights protects the governed, not the governing"). Specifically, Secunda argues
against constitutional rules that would insulate public universities, as public employers, from claims
brought by faculty members and other university employees, while leaving open the possibility
that universities might enjoy rights against competing sovereigns such as the federal government.
See, e.g., id. at 1807 n.251.
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fit with standard assumptions about the limited or nonexistent nature of
First Amendment rights for state actors. That might seem to preclude any
strong version of a First Amendment institution argument for educational
autonomy, at least where public institutions are concerned.
For several reasons, I doubt that this objection has as much traction as
one might assume. First, the doctrine in this area is hardly set in stone. As
David Fagundes has written, 73 the most definitive statement by the Supreme
Court suggesting that government actors are not entitled to claim First
Amendment rights is a mere concurrence by Justice Stewart in Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee. '74 In that case, Justice
Stewart suggested that treating broadcasters as state actors would eliminate
their ability to engage in a constitutionally protected exercise of editorial
discretion, because the First Amendment "protects the press from governmen-
tal interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government."'75
Although this point has often been treated as "well-settled,"'76 the
Supreme Court in fact has left open the question of state actors' First
Amendment rights against other and higher government authorities, at
least in some circumstances.'77 Most recently, in United States v. American
Library Ass'n, 78 the Court again noted the argument that "Government
entities do not have First Amendment rights," but declined to "decide this
question."'79 While most courts have nevertheless treated the question as
closed, several thoughtful opinions by lower federal and state courts have
suggested that state actors may enjoy at least some First Amendment rights
in some circumstances. For example, in Creek v. Village of Westhaven,'"
Judge Posner noted that in a variety of other areas, municipal corporations
are treated as persons under the law.'8' More importantly, he noted that in
some circumstances, "a municipality is the voice of its residents-is, indeed,
a megaphone amplifying voices that might not otherwise be audible," and
thus, it would be appropriate to see a law affecting the municipality's right
to speak as a kind of "curtailment of the unquestioned First Amendment
173. See Fagundes, supra note 26, at 1641-42.
174. 412 U.S. 94.
175. Id. at 139.
176. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d. 941,944 (W.D. Va. 2001).
177. See, e.g., City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.7 (1976) ("We need not decide whether a municipal corporation
as an employer has First Amendment rights to hear the views of its citizens and employees.").
178. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
179. Id. at 210-11.
180. 80 F.3d 186 (7th Cir. 1996).
181. Id. at 193 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Moor v.
Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717-18 (1973)).
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right of those residents."'' 2 And in the lower court decision in American
Library Ass'n,"8' the three-judge panel carefully examined the status of public
libraries' First Amendment rights, noting that "the First Amendment is not
phrased in terms of who holds the right, but rather what is protected," and
concluding that "the notion that public libraries may assert First
Amendment rights for the purpose of making an unconstitutional conditions
claim is clearly plausible, and may well be correct."'84
Thus, current law does not authoritatively require us to assume that
state actors can never claim First Amendment rights against other gov-
ernmental entities. In appropriate contexts, the argument to the contrary
may well be more persuasive. As Fagundes notes, neither the constitutional
text nor constitutional history demand a different conclusion.' At the
level of theory, the argument for an absolute bar against the First Amendment
rights of state actors also falls short. In some cases, according First
Amendment rights to some subset of state actors may "further[] the
Constitution's systemic goal of maintaining a free and open marketplace of
ideas," 6 by ensuring that discrete governmental actors can continue
playing a vital role as participants in the marketplace of ideas with at least
some protection from larger or superior governmental actors.
This point, it bears emphasizing, is especially true for governmental
entities such as public universities, although it applies equally well to
other public entities that I would classify as First Amendment institutions,
such as libraries.'87 For these institutions are precisely that-institutions,
which operate far more according to the norms and traditions of the
university than they do as typical government sovereigns. The relationship
between universities and the larger state around them, or between
universities and their constituents, such as students or faculty, is thus far
closer to the relationship between private universities and other internal or
external actors than it is to the usual relationship between the sovereign
and its citizens. In short, whatever the merits of Paul Secunda's view that
182. Id. at 193.
183. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd,
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
184. Id. at 492 n.36.
185. Fagundes, supra note 26, at 1647-59.
186. Id. at 1662.
187. Cf. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (drawing an analogy
to the Court's constitutional academic freedom decisions to argue that publicly funded libraries
are entitled to First Amendment protection in their exercise of discretion with respect to
collection decisions).
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the "Bill of Rights protects the governed, not the governing, '  public
universities hardly fit our usual conception of what it means to be a
''governing" state body.
As I have already suggested, this conclusion is buttressed in the case of
public universities by the fact that most of them are expressly granted an
atypical amount of autonomy under state law. To reprise my earlier
example, Michigan's constitution grants the regents of the University of
Michigan "general supervision of its institution and the control and
direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds." '189 Where
states themselves are willing to grant whole or partial autonomy to
public universities in conducting their affairs, we may perhaps be less
disturbed by the notion that those institutions might enjoy some ability
to assert constitutional rights as First Amendment rights holders against
the state itself.
Finally, even if one is unwilling to adopt wholesale the view that
public universities, as First Amendment institutions, can assert a broad
array of rights against the state, in practice it may not matter much. On at
least the tacit level on which First Amendment institutionalism operates in
current jurisprudence, 9' courts are likely to continue applying existing
constitutional doctrine in the area of public universities with at least some
sense of the qualities that mark those entities as institutionally distinct and
as valuable contributors to public discourse. Although I have argued for a
more vigorous reading of the case and its implications, Grutter v. Bollinger 9'
itself might be seen in this light. There, in its application of strict scrutiny
in a Fourteenth Amendment context, the Court did not expressly give the
University of Michigan Law School a freestanding First Amendment right
to preserve its race-conscious admissions program. Rather, it engaged in
its strict scrutiny analysis in a deferential fashion, in keeping with the
"special niche in our constitutional tradition" that universities occupy.192
Thus, even if we do not accept that public universities enjoy full First
Amendment rights against other state actors, we might still resolve any
disputes involving those institutions with a sense of the First Amendment
dimensions raised by those actors.9  Secunda himself, as I understand his
188. Secunda, supra note 172, at 1771.
189. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
190. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
191. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
192. Id. at 329.
193. Cf. Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 925.
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argument, would require at least this much in the context of employer-
employee disputes in the university context.
1 94
In sum, the conventional assumption that governmental actors enjoy
no First Amendment rights would seem to present difficulties for a First
Amendment institutional approach, or at least an institutional approach
that would treat public and private universities as essentially identical for
most constitutional purposes. But that assumption is neither as well-
grounded in the case law nor as supported by broader theories of state
action and the First Amendment as one might assume. In many instances,
it may well make sense to think of state actors as First Amendment
speakers. That is especially true in the case of public universities, whose
institutional distinctness and unique role in advancing First Amendment
values set them apart from the common run of state actors. I thus conclude
that this objection ultimately does not derail the First Amendment
institutional project.
C. "More Speech Is Better": The Argument for Extending
First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector
The objections discussed above focus largely on the difficulties of
thinking about public universities as rights holders. Objectors to an institu-
tional approach who take such a perspective might allow for an expansive view
of private universities as First Amendment rights holders, while applying
the full panoply of First Amendment restrictions to the public university as
if it were a typical state sovereign. Under this approach, public universities,
under the weight of generally applicable First Amendment doctrines such
as public forum law, or under general rules of content neutrality, would thus
be greatly limited in their ability to regulate their own affairs in accord
with their academic missions.
By contrast, another set of potential objections to the treatment of
universities as First Amendment institutions comes from the other side of
the public-private divide. Rather than resisting the treatment of public
universities as if they are private actors, it urges the application to private
universities of First Amendment standards that would typically apply to
194. See Secunda, supra note 172, at 1809-13; see also Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122,
at 937-38 (noting that the Court has often employed constitutional academic freedom "as a
counter to constitutional arguments posed by challengers to university actions" rather than
directly labeling it as a freestanding right, and observing that "it would introduce a novel notion
of what is a constitutional right to hold that one has special, constitutional weight against other
constitutionally protected interests while still being vulnerable to state legislation").
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state actors. Thus, rather than treating all universities as if they were private
institutions, it would erase the public-private divide from the opposite
direction, seeking the greater application of First Amendment norms to
private-sector educational institutions when they seek to regulate their own
speech environment. In recognition of Erwin Chemerinsky's contribution
in these pages a decade ago, we might label this suite of arguments the "more
speech is better" objection to First Amendment institutionalism.' 9
The crux of Chemerinsky's argument is that "[tiraditional law always
favors the institution's interests over the individual's. Traditional law, as
embodied in the state action doctrine, creates a bright-line rule that the
private institution always wins and the individual fired or disciplined by it
for expression always loses."'96 Chemerinsky is troubled by this because, in
his view, "in general, speech interests of individuals are more important
than free speech interests of institutions," and "private power can infringe
the same [individual] rights [of expression] with the same effect as the
government."'97  Because, in his view, "if speech is good, more speech is
better," Chemerinsky argues that it is positively desirable for legislatures to
enact "statutes that provide that individuals in private schools have the
same speech right as individuals in public schools," provided that those
statutes allow private institutions to restrict speech by their constituents if
they can show that it is "expression unprotected by the First Amendment"--
a relatively small and unremarkable category-or "that a sufficient interest is
served by limiting expression. '
In the course of advancing this argument, Chemerinsky makes a
number of key moves that further demonstrate its tension with the First
Amendment institutions approach I have offered here. He is emphatic that
the application of antidiscrimination statutes to private schools "is a
government-imposed orthodoxy that is now widely accepted.""' He largely
denies that there is anything to be gained by cloaking universities in the
garb of "communitarian self-determination," writing, "I am very skeptical
that many... institutions really are communities in any meaningful sense
of that term. A university the size of the University of Southern California
is hardly a community in any meaningful way."2°° He rejects any analogy
195. See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech Is Better, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1635 (1998) [hereinafter
Chemerinsky, More Speech].
196. Id. at 1639.
197. Id. at 1641.
198. Id. at 1643.
199. Id. at 1637.
200. Id. at 1639.
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between private institutions such as universities and the parade organizers
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston.01
And he suggests that it is not especially harmful to subject private insti-
tutions to the sorts of First Amendment norms that might apply to public
actors, arguing:
Institutions still can express their own messages, they just cannot do
so by silencing others. If the institution wants to express its
opposition to civil rights or its support for the Viet Nam War, it can
do so, but it should not advocate its position by suppressing the
speech of others .... [Pirivate institutions required to obey First
Amendment norms by other laws are not obligated to express any
specific message and can disavow any message expressed by others.0 2
In short, the more speech is better argument advances a view that
would subject private institutions, including universities, to the whole
panoply of First Amendment doctrines that generally limit attempts on the
part of the institution-usually, a state actor-to regulate its speech envi-
ronment in any sort of content- or viewpoint-specific way.
Such an approach would obviously curtail the institutional First
Amendment project. After all, the institutional approach, if anything,
seeks the opposite: It wishes to "incorporate private sector norms into the
First Amendment. 2 3  Under the more speech is better approach, to the
contrary, a private university would be hard pressed to justify any effort to
select, exclude, or restrict either particular speakers on campus, whether
professors, students, or others, or the content of that speech. Under the
framework that a more speech is better approach seems to propose, for
example, any law school, public or private, would likely be obligated to
allow full and equal access to all manner of on-campus employers, including
the military employers whose on-campus presence the plaintiffs in Rumsfeld
205v. FAIR2" sought to restrict.
201. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
202. Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 195, at 1642.
203. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 587.
204. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
205. It is worth noting that Chemerinsky served as one of the named plaintiffs in
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), and has subsequently written in
criticism of the Court's decision in that case. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Supreme Court
Was Wrong About the Solomon Amendment, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 201 (2006)
[hereinafter Chemerinsky, Why the Court Was Wrong]. Of course, his views may have
changed in the intervening years. And one might attempt to reconcile the views he takes in
his earlier article with those he advanced as a litigant in FAIR. Nevertheless, I find it
difficult to fairly reconcile his earlier views with his willingness to advance the FAIR
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The best response to the more speech is better suite of arguments remains
the important article to which Chemerinsky was responding-one published in
these pages by the late Julian Eule, with the assistance of Jonathan Varat.06 Eule
questioned "the wisdom and constitutionality of imposing the speech norms of
the First Amendment on the private sector."2 7 "Uniformity imposed in
litigation as a named plaintiff. I do not mean to overstate this criticism, and hence have
relegated it to a footnote, but it merits some discussion.
On a basic level, some of the arguments advanced in More Speech are in tension with some of
his later statements in and about the FAIR litigation. For example, he argued in More Speech that
the Supreme Court's decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston
adds little to the argument against importing First Amendment norms to private institutions,
because "[a] parade ... exists to convey a message. A school or workplace, by contrast, exists
primarily to perform other functions," and thus may be required to "tolerate in its midst speech
that it dislikes." Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 195, at 1642-43. Today, by contrast, he
calls Hurley an example of "forced expression" that applies to the law school plaintiffs in FAIR.
See Chemerinsky, Why the Court Was Wrong, supra, at 211-15. Similarly, he wrote in More Speech
that private institutions "can protect [their] speech interests by expressing [their] own message,"
but cannot "silenc[e] others." Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 195, at 1642 (citing
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)). In FAIR, by contrast, the respondents
argued that PruneYard "does not come close to justifying a law that demands a school's active
assistance in helping a specified outsider disseminate a specific message that is deeply objectionable
to the institution." Brief for Respondents, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, at 23 (2005). To
be sure, the addition of the law schools' compelled "active assistance" superficially distinguishes
PruneYard from FAIR-if one believes that such acts as "maintain[ing] leaflets in binders for
reference by students" rise to the level of compelled speech. Chemerinsky, Why the Court Was
Wrong, supra, at 210. But it is hard to square that distinction with the earlier view that schools
"primarily ... perform other functions" that the government may legitimately regulate without
falling afoul of constitutional values.
These tensions are worth addressing because they lead to a broader point. If one believes that
it is permissible to impose First Amendment norms on private-sector actors such as universities
because universities are not "communit[ies] in any meaningful way," Chemerinsky, More Speech,
supra note 195, at 1639, one ought to be reluctant to advance the kinds of arguments made on
behalf of the respondents in FAIR, in which law schools were treated as "normative institution[s],"
Brief for Respondents, supra, at 28, with a strong sense of community. If one believes that
universities are communities, however, that belief should call into question the application of
antidiscrimination laws to these institutions. Despite the respondents' valiant efforts to distinguish
such laws in FAIR, see Brief for Respondents, supra, at 33-35, a defense of the law school on the
grounds that it is a unique expressive community ought to raise serious questions about the vitality
of decisions such as Runyon v. McCrary, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), at least as applied to private
universities. Conversely, one may argue that those laws properly apply to law schools-but one
should then seriously question the merits of the arguments made by the respondents in FAIR. I
doubt that one can comfortably maintain both views. Thus, the tensions between Chemerinsky's
earlier writing and his current views on FAIR are worth noting because they stand in for a broader
tension, evident in FAIR itself, between the view that universities are expressive communities and
the view that they should be subject to antidiscrimination laws. I have more to say about these
issues below. See infra Part III.
206. See generally Eule & Varat, supra note 165; see id. at 1537 n.** (describing the project
and Jonathan Varat's generous contribution to completing it); see also Jonathan D. Varat, When
May Government Prefer One Source of Private Expression Over Another?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (1998).
207. See Eule & Varat, supra note 165, at 1542.
the name of free speech" on both public and private institutions, he
asserted, "is in tension with the core of the very right itself-the proscrip-
tion against government-imposed orthodoxy.""8 That is especially true, I
think, in the case of universities.2" As Eule observed, the more speech is
better approach
deprives private communities and institutions-particularly those
devoted to expressive functions-of rights to offer to, and consume
from, the marketplace of ideas alternative conceptions of how best to
facilitate speech, including how best to allocate speech authority among
its constituents; and, in the case of private educational or other
institutions that take on the function of inculcating norms of behavior
and attitude, how best to socialize or acculturate its constituents
through speech norms that the community freely chooses itself."
This point is especially pertinent in the case of universities because, as
I argue more fully below,"' although universities may share a number of
common features, they do not all share precisely the same definition of their
educational mission, of academic freedom, or of what is required by either.
Simply imposing on all universities, public or private, a uniform vision of
free speech rules derived from the First Amendment doctrine that applies to
typical state actors thus deprives them of the "'ability to define their
missions with different emphases,"' with all that may follow from those
differences." 2 It deprives "[pirivate communities and institutions"-including
universities-of "the freedom to define themselves. ' '1
Eule makes these and other arguments at greater length than I can
afford here, and with more eloquence than I can muster. Suffice it to say
that I share his general sense that, at the very least, we should hesitate long
and hard before seeking to treat both public and private universities under
the same set of acontextual, individual-centered First Amendment doctrines
208. Id.
209. Julian Eule and Jonathan Varat themselves are far more circumspect in making this
point, however, since they do not believe the Supreme Court has clearly delineated either the
existence or the scope of some degree of "institutional freedom from government intervention"
enjoyed by universities. Id. at 1615 (emphasis omitted). See generally id. at 1613-17. Nevertheless,
their general attitude appears to be that courts and legislatures should think carefully before
treading in this area. See id. at 1617. Given that this Article argues positively for such a right of
educational institutional autonomy, I would go further than Eule and Varat, whose approach
was largely descriptive and thus relied more closely on existing doctrine.
210. Id. at 1617-18.
211. See infra pp. 1547-49.
212. Id. at 1622 (quoting KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDMDUALS, COMMUNITIES,
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 75 (1995)).
213. Id. at 1623.
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recommended by the more speech is better argument. We might at least
conclude, with Varat, that "blanket government elimination of the free
speech interests of private institutions. . . ought not to be exempted from
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny just because the government is flying
the banner of promoting speech"-or, I would add, equality, or other
constitutional values."4 The more speech is better argument ultimately fails
to "[p]rotect[ ] the right of interpretive variation among private institutions"
including universities, and, in so doing, may reduce, rather than enhance,
the stock and variety of useful speech available to us.2"5 The more speech is
better arguments are thus ultimately an unpersuasive barrier to the project
of treating universities as First Amendment institutions.
D. The Special Privileges Objection
Finally, a standard set of objections one can anticipate in advancing an
institutional First Amendment approach to the university is that, to the
extent that such an approach would leave educational institutions, public
or private, with a greater set of rights or privileges than those enjoyed by
other speakers or institutions, such an approach is inconsistent with both
existing First Amendment doctrine and with broader First Amendment
values. We might call this the argument against special privileges for
universities as First Amendment institutions.
Of course, this objection is not limited to universities alone. Any
approach to the First Amendment that advances the view that a variety of
institutions-the press, religious associations, libraries, and so on-deserve
distinctive treatment under the First Amendment will inevitably invite the
same complaint. And indeed, the objection to granting a "preferred consti-
tutional position ' 6 to particular institutions has been raised in other areas
in which institutional arguments have been made. In particular, the
objection to preferred status has long been part of the standard suite of
arguments against granting the press any special privileges under the First
Amendment, despite the textual warrant for such an approach provided by
the very existence of the Press Clause.217 Thus, the argument from special
privileges is not limited to universities alone, but might be applied across a
range of potential First Amendment institutions.
214. Varat, supra note 206, at 1647.
215. Id. at 1650.
216. Lewis, supra note 42, at 605.
217. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 42; Lewis, supra note 42, at 605.
Universities as First Amendment Institutions 1535
There are a number of responses to such an objection, some descriptive
and some normative. First, as I have argued above, despite the acontextual
impulse in First Amendment law, courts already grant some special status
to universities as First Amendment institutions. That is most apparent in
the area of public universities and affirmative action, in which, as I noted at the
outset of this Article," 8 it is difficult, if not impossible, to see the Supreme
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger"9 as having treated the University of Michigan
Law School the same as it would have treated other state actors. But it is
also apparent elsewhere. Take, for example, the greater latitude to engage
in content-specific speech selection that the Court allowed the defendant
in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,"' where it treated
the defendant, a public entity, not as "the State," but as a broadcaster engaging
in the "exercise of journalistic discretion." '' Even the press, the original
font of the objections to preferred status for speakers under the First
Amendment, in many ways enjoys a quiet form of preferred status under
both constitutional and statutory law. 2 As a descriptive matter then, it is
not clear how well-founded this argument really is.
A lesser descriptive point must also be made, one that centers directly
on the university as distinct from other First Amendment institutions.
Much of the force of the objection to treating the press, in particular, as a
preferred institution comes from the sheer difficulty of distinguishing the
press from other individual or institutional speakers. 3 I am not convinced
that this objection poses any insuperable obstacles to conferring special
institutional status on the press-or, for that matter, that it precludes courts
from conferring a somewhat different set of privileges on other press-like
institutions like the blogosphere.2 But as I have already argued, I doubt the
same objection can be raised to the treatment of universities as First Amendment
institutions. Whatever questions might exist around the margins, in
general the university is sufficiently distinct and identifiable that it does
not raise the same kind of difficult definitional questions that might arise
in taking a First Amendment institutions approach in other areas. 5
218. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
219. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
220. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1988).
221. Id. at 1637; see also Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra
note 26, at 89.
222. See Horwitz, Blog, supra note 26, at 51-52.
223. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-801 (Burger, C.J., concurring);
David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 435-45 (2002).
224. See generally Horwitz, Blog, supra note 33.
225. See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
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More generally, the special privileges objection rests in part on the
view that it would disserve the values of the First Amendment to confer any
special constitutional status on particular institutions. This is, after all, an
age of content neutrality, an age in which courts "frown[ ] on regulations
that discriminate based on the content of the speech or the identity of the
speaker." 6 This is a valid concern, to be sure. We should be reluctant to
give courts and legislators the tools by which they can disadvantage particular
speakers, or which they can use as proxies for purposes of engaging in
viewpoint discrimination."' But we must also keep in mind the possibility
that, as Varat puts it in a somewhat different context, an institutional
approach might actually "produce more speech" than the current approach.2 '
As Varat writes, "[pirotecting the right of interpretive variation among
private institutions about what rules will facilitate speech may promote
speech as well as, or possibly better than, a lock-step approach."2 9 We need
do little work to extend that statement somewhat further for present
purposes. A legal approach that acknowledges institutional variation in the
universe of First Amendment subjects, and recognizes the importance of
granting some degree of autonomy to some of those institutions, may
promote the capacity of these institutions to make vital contributions to the
broader public discourse better than an approach that treats all speakers
the same.23 Nor is it clear that these privileges would come at the
significant loss of speech rights for other noninstitutional speakers.
Finally, two important points should be made about the very notion of
First Amendment institutionalism as a form of privilege. First, as Schauer
notes, the point of First Amendment institutionalism may be "less about
the degree of protection" such institutions enjoy, and "more about the kinds
of institutions... that might serve as appropriate units of First Amendment
analysis.""' In other words, the argument for First Amendment institutionalism
is not simply an argument for special treatment of particular institutions,
although that might be the outcome of such an approach in some cases. Rather,
there is a broader issue at stake here: whether it makes sense for the law to
blind itself to the existence and the nature of various speech institutions and
structure itself around a set of legal categories, an approach that many have
226. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 47 n.4 (1999) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
227. See Carpenter, supra note 153, at 1410.
228. Varat, supra note 206, at 1650 (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. See generally Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 26.
231. Id. at 1277.
Universities as First Amendment Institutions 1537
concluded has simply led to doctrinal incoherence, or whether First
Amendment doctrine might more sensibly be organized around a different
and prelegal set of categories, including institutional categories. In this
sense, the institutional approach has less to do with privilege as such, and
more to do with how the law should understand the world, and whether there
are better ways for courts to deal with the tension in the law between
acontextuality and facts on the ground.232
Lastly, as I discuss below,233 it is a mistake to think of the institutional
approach invariably as a question of additional privileges enjoyed by universities
or other First Amendment institutions. From the beginning of our country's
understanding of academic freedom, it has always been understood that any
privileges enjoyed by the university or its faculty carry with them a corresponding
set of obligations. Thus, in its 1915 Declaration of Principles, the American
Association of University Professors stressed that "there are no rights without
corresponding duties." 4 For example, although we would not normally
think of First Amendment freedoms for the individual speaker as dependent
upon the content and quality of his or her speech, the academic freedom of
individual faculty members exists only within the framework of the expectation
that they will "carry on their work in the temper of the scientific inquirer." '235 In
modem terms, we assume that the academic freedom of a faculty member
depends on his or her ability to satisfy the standards of his or her discipline.
Similarly, as we shall see, autonomy carries with it a concomitant obligation
for universities to seriously ponder, and then live by, their own sense of what
academic freedom requires. In some cases, that sense of academic freedom might
well constrain the freedom of the institution to act, beyond any constraints on
speech that normally apply to individual speakers.
We thus ought not assume that educational autonomy is an absolute license
for universities. Rather, it is a way of suggesting that the liberties and constraints
under which universities operate ought to come from our understanding of the
nature of the university as an institution itself, and not from an awkward
attempt to flatten out differences between all speakers and all institutions across
the vast terrain of public discourse occupied by the First Amendment.236
232. See Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1747 (2007) [hereinafter, Schauer, Institutions].
233. See infra pp. 1555-58.
234. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom
and Academic Tenure (1915), reprinted in LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 393, 401;
see also Byme, supra note 17, at 277-78; Walter P. Metzger, Professional and Legal Limits to
Academic Freedom, 20 J.C. & U.L. 1, 2-3 (1993).
235. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, supra note 234, at 401.
236. Cf. Post, supra note 26.
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In sum, although a number of important questions and objections have
been raised to the treatment of universities as First Amendment institutions, in
my view, none of them are sufficiently disturbing or persuasive to rebut the
arguments for an institutional approach. That is not to say, however, that those
of us who favor such an approach are not confronted by other, more difficult,
questions. It is to those hard questions that I now turn.
III. HARD QuEsTIONS
Although I have argued that a variety of what might be deemed external
objections to the institutional approach to the university are not sufficiently
persuasive to derail the institutional project, we are still left with some hard
questions that are internal to the project. That is, even if one takes as a given
that the institutional approach is, on the whole, a good one, champions of this
approach must openly confront some difficult questions about how to apply it. In
this Part, I confront two sets of hard questions about the treatment of universities
as First Amendment institutions, and then apply the insights gathered over the
course of Parts II and III to several recent controversies that have arisen
in the university context.
A. The Scope and Limits of the Treatment of Universities
as First Amendment Institutions
The first set of questions we must confront here has to do, on the most basic
terms, with the application of the First Amendment institutional approach to
universities. What is the scope of an approach? How should courts go about
applying a distinctly institutional vision of the university under the First
Amendment? To what sorts of questions would the institutional approach apply,
and with what outcomes? And what are the limits of such an approach, if any?
As I have already argued, the answer to these questions depends
considerably on the degree of stringency of the institutional approach one
adopts.23 A weak-form institutional approach, for instance, would differ little in
outcome from the current approach courts take in cases involving universities,
although it might be somewhat more open in acknowledging the role that
institutionalism has to play in such questions. A medium-form institutional
approach might ratchet up the autonomy of the university still further,
237. See supra Part I.D.
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leading to a set of outcomes favoring universities' freedom to act according to
their academic missions without outside interference, while still leaving room
for the imposition of some "constitutionally prescribed limits. 23 8 A strong-
form version of the institutional approach, on the other hand, would be a
substantially jurisdictional approach, in which the fact that a university
made a decision would be substantial or conclusive grounds for finding that,
absent unusual circumstances, the law could have no further operation
within the borders of the university community.239
Under any of these versions of the institutional approach to the university,
but especially under the latter two versions, we quickly run into pressing
questions about the scope and limits of such an approach. Universities, after all,
are expansive communities, microcosms of society that engage in a wide variety
of activities we might not associate exclusively or even strongly with their
traditional academic missions. Would an institutional approach to the univer-
sity, for example, insulate a university from the operation of antitrust laws with
respect to college sports?
2 40
One might respond easily enough that such activities are not the central
concern of the institutional approach to universities under the First Amendment;
our primary concern is with "genuinely academic decisions,"24 ' and there the
university should, indeed, enjoy substantial, or even absolute, autonomy.
Outside the scope of academic decisionmaking, however, the university should
be subject to generally prevailing laws and legal norms. Of course, this response
raises difficult questions of boundary drawing, since it will not always be
clear what constitutes the subject of a genuinely academic decision.
Leaving aside that question, however, one might still resist the conclusion
that the law should have a limited role to play within the sphere of genuinely
academic decisions. What of a decision to refuse to hire or to promote a faculty
member, which that individual contends is the result of nothing more than
racial or gender discrimination? What of decisions to use race, not as a factor
in creating a diverse classroom, but in order to exclude students of some races in
238. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
239. Cf. Hills, supra note 26, at 186 (discussing the idea of "judgment according to academic
standards" as "incorporating a jurisdictional component").
240. See, e.g., Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 17, at 332 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85 (1984) (applying the Sherman Act to the National Collegiate Athletic Association's
(NCAA) plan to restrict the total number of live televised football games, without any special regard for
the collegiate context in which the case arose)); Mark D. Selwyn, Higher Education Under Fire: The New
Target of Antitrust, 26 COLUM. J.L & Soc. PROBs. 117 (1992) (discussing other areas in which
universities have been subject to regulation under the antitrust laws).
241. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
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order to create a nondiverse student body?42 To the extent that an institutional
approach to universities favors some positive rights against the imposition of
state or federal laws attached to funding or other benefits, as seemed to be the
plaintiffs' argument in FAIR, what of the university that seeks to retain tax-
exempt status despite its sincere desire to engage in discriminatory
academic policies?.. What of a university's insistence that students fulfill
academic requirements that allegedly fall especially heavily on students
suffering from disabilities e"4 And, specifically on the public side of the ledger,
what of state universities that use the institutional autonomy argument to
impose student speech codes?245 In short, does this list of examples demand
that advocates of an institutional approach closely define and defend a more
limited scope of operation for an institutional treatment of universities under
the First Amendment? Does this list of potential "bad" outcomes compel a
different or narrower approach?
In my view, although it surely is not the only possible approach, one should
treat questions of scope and limits as follows. Universities are not entitled to
blanket immunity from the general operation of the law. But they should be
entitled to substantial deference, to a degree that indeed approaches immu-
nity, to the extent that they are making genuinely academic decisions."'
242. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
243. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding the denial of
tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University, which argued on free exercise grounds for the right to
deny interracial dating among its students).
244. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bors, Academic Freedom Faces Learning Disabilities: Guckenberger
v. Boston University, 25 J.C. & U.L. 581 (1999); James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic
Standards Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and III of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 75 NEB. L. REV. 27 (1996).
245. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 503-11.
246. The litigation in Guckenberger v. Boston University, 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998), a case
involving Boston University's refusal to lift foreign-language requirements for students claiming an
exemption under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), may be instructive on this point. In this
case, the district court initially refused to dismiss the action, noting that the university administration had
not "engage[d] in any form of reasoned deliberation as to whether modifications [in the foreign-language
policy] would change the essential academic standards of [the College's] liberal arts curriculum."
Id. at 85 (quotation and citation omitted). On remand, the court held that the university had
subsequently engaged in careful deliberation on the question of whether "the foreign language
requirement is fundamental to the nature of the liberal arts degree at Boston University." Id. at
87. The court then deferred to that determination, holding that in such circumstances, "the ADA does not
authorize the courts to intervene even if a majority of other comparable academic institutions [would]
disagree [in similar circumstances]." Id. at 90. While one may disagree about the burden of proof a
university must meet in the first instance in asserting a right to deference to genuinely academic decisions,
and about the propriety of a court ordering a university to adopt a particular deliberative process
in reaching such a situation, see id. at 85-86, Guckenberger still nicely illustrates the degree to
which a university may be protected from the application of generally applicable nondiscrimination
laws such as the ADA if such laws would interfere with a sincere and genuine decision on the part
of the university--even if other universities might reach different conclusions in similar cases.
The argument for strong deference will be especially weighty in those cases in
which the university, in reaching an academic decision, is roughly following
the established norms and procedures that are in place for such questions.
Those practices will have developed in light of both the general norms that
govern most universities and academic disciplines, and the particular sense
of that individual university as to what its academic mission requires.
Courts should defer substantially to the university in such circumstances.
Moreover, in deferring to a university's academic decisions, and in ceding
their own authority in favor of the norms and practices in place at a
university, courts should be careful not to police the boundaries of the
"genuinely academic" too rigorously. They should be reluctant to second-
guess a university's own judgment as to the proper scope of academic decisions.
Thus, courts should grant universities substantial autonomy to engage in
educational decisions; and they should defer, too, in determining what
constitutes an academic decision.
One might object that such an approach would give universities (and,
in analogous situations, other First Amendment institutions) far too much
license to abuse their autonomy.247 As understandable as these objections
may be, they are surely overstated. They are premised on the belief that
any institution given such legal license will act irresponsibly once loosed of
the restraints placed on it by the law. But-and this is a central piece of
the argument for First Amendment institutionalism-there are strong
reasons to believe otherwise. We ought to remember first that academic
freedom in the United States is not a concept that is native to the law.
Rather, it developed over more than a century of debate and discussion
within the academy itself.24 A sense of the scope and limits of proper behavior
within the university setting has long since been internalized by universities
themselves, and incorporated into a framework of norms and practices driven
by universities as corporate entities, and by the demands of the scholarly
disciplines that form the body of departments within the university. 249
247. I imagine this objection would flow naturally, for example, from Chemerinsky's more
speech is better arguments, for both public and private universities. See Chemerinsky, More
Speech, supra note 195. Neal Katyal also addresses the risks of abuse that an autonomy-oriented
approach to universities entails. See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of
Educational Autonomy, 31 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 557, 565 (2003) ("As with all forms of deference,
the risk with educational autonomy arguments is that the institutions to which deference is
shown will use them to hide their abuses.").
248. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 472-73.
249. See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text; see also Byrne, Threat, supra note
122, at 91 n.77 ("The Constitution does not create the speech norms of academic freedom; they
have been created by the values and practical needs of organized scholarship and advanced teaching.").
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Although universities, like all institutions, are imperfect, it is nevertheless
true that they have generally coalesced around a set of institutional norms
that would govern and restrain the university even in the absence of
externally imposed legal constraints. These institutional norms will
generally serve as a strong barrier against abuses of the privilege of
institutional autonomy. Indeed, it may well already be the case that these
institutional norms are a far more important constraint on the university on
a day-to-day basis than are existing legal norms.
Most academics, for example, would resist any move by a university
to engage in flagrant discrimination in faculty hiring on the basis of race or
gender; as J. Peter Byrne notes, "[pirejudice is not an academic value.""
2 '
An effort by a university to engage in open discrimination of this kind
would run into a series of barriers, including the pressures imposed on the
university by its students and alumni. More importantly, perhaps, it
would run into resistance from faculty members whose sense of the proper
bases for a university's decisionmaking are influenced by the professional
norms they absorb through their disciplines.25" ' Finally, a university's exercise
of its autonomy will be strongly influenced and constrained by the university's
own sense of its academic mission.
Thus, we can predict that most universities, even if granted
considerable legal autonomy, would still observe most of the civic norms-
nondiscrimination, due process, and so on-that are usually enforced
through the law. When these internal constraints are added to the
importance of universities in the broader firmament of public discourse and
discovery, it is far from clear that the marginal increased risk of abuse on
the part of these institutions outweighs the potential value of treating them
as meaningfully autonomous entities.
It is not clear that even the worst-case scenarios painted by those
who strongly support the imposition of generally applicable laws to the
university community provide undue cause for alarm. Chemerinsky, for
example, worries openly about any argument that would seem to obstruct
the operation of antidiscrimination laws in the university context. He
acknowledges that such laws represent "a tremendous intrusion on the daily
operations of an entity" such as a university, but nevertheless strongly
resists any argument that private universities, let alone public universities,
might invoke any autonomy claims against such laws."
2 For similar reasons,
250. Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 941.
251. See generally Calhoun, supra note 107.
252. Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 195, at 1638.
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the plaintiffs in the FAIR litigation went to great lengths to distinguish
whatever claims for institutional autonomy they were making in that case
from the broader question of whether universities should be subject to any
degree of immunity from the federal civil rights statutes.253
But it is not clear to me that advocates of an institutional approach to
the First Amendment should be so reluctant to acknowledge that an
argument for a genuinely meaningful degree of institutional autonomy
for universities does call into question the circumstances in which
antidiscrimination laws can apply to the university. The strong-form
version of an institutional First Amendment approach to universities, at
least, would likely undermine the vitality, in cases in which the university
openly asserted an academic interest in discrimination, of the Court's
rulings in Runyon v. McCrary254 and Bob Jones University v. United States.25
For the reasons I have offered, most universities are unlikely to take
advantage of such a right to openly discriminate, especially if they are
obliged to link their interest in discrimination to a public statement that
their academic mission requires them to do so. Nevertheless, an
institutional approach to universities under the First Amendment surely
suggests that any university bold enough to invoke such a right would have
a serious argument against the enforcement of the civil rights laws.
That fact is surely a breaking point for those who might otherwise
favor such an approach. For myself, I recognize the strong appeal of decisions
like Runyon or Bob Jones, given this nation's long history of discrimination
and the value of maintaining equality as a social and legal norm.
Nevertheless, such decisions should be at least somewhat troubling to those
who believe that universities and other First Amendment institutions ought
to enjoy substantial autonomy. I thus conclude that the benefits of defining
a broad scope of autonomy for universities as First Amendment institutions
outweigh the potential risks of granting them substantial autonomy in the
face of generally applicable laws, such as the civil rights statutes, at least in
cases in which the university is engaging in genuinely academic
decisionmaking. Obviously, there is room for reasonable disagreement
here, and much may turn on how strong a form of institutionalism one favors.
For now, at least, we can conclude that those who champion the notion of
the university as a substantially autonomous First Amendment institution
253. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 205, at 33-35.
254. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
255. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). For similar arguments in the private university context, see
David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities' Racial Preferences
and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619 (2001).
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must acknowledge that important and difficult questions will surround the
issue of the scope and limits of that autonomy.
B. The Relationship Between the Institutional Approach
and Academic Freedom
A second set of hard questions arises with respect to the relationship
between the institutional approach to the university sketched out above
and the concept of academic freedom itself. In the scholarly literature on
the constitutional principle of academic freedom, one often comes across the
assumption that academic freedom is largely synonymous with institutional
educational autonomy, or efforts to subsume one under the other.
256 This
understanding is surely encouraged by the courts, whose defense of
institutional autonomy for universities is generally closely linked to the
value of academic freedom. For example, in his famous concurrence in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2"' Justice Powell identifies a
university's ability "to make its own judgments as to education" as a fundamental
aspect of the four freedoms of a university outlined by Justice Frankfurter in
his concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.25 Educational institutional
autonomy has thus often been closely equated with academic freedom.
In fact, however, the two are not synonymous. Granting institutional
autonomy to universities may generally serve the cause of enhancing
academic freedom, but the two are not necessarily the same thing.
259 There
may be good reasons to equate the two, particularly for legal purposes,
26 but it
is important to keep in mind that there is a distinction between a legal
principle of institutional autonomy for universities and the general principle
of academic freedom outside the courts. For one thing, referring to
256. Cf. Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra note 26, at 919 (discussing the ways in which
"an institutional understanding of academic freedom" is "more faithful to the best account of
what academic freedom is all about").
257. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
258. Id. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J., concurring) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 264 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
259. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV.
817, 818 (1983) ("[Tlhe reasons that make a strong case for institutional autonomy are not
identical to those that justify the protection of academic freedom. Institutional autonomy and
academic freedom are related but distinct ideas. Indeed, while they reinforce one another at
some points, they may straightforwardly conflict at others.").
260. Thus, in contrast to Matthew Finkin, J. Peter Byrne argues that "constitutional
academic freedom" should be understood as an institutional and not an individual freedom. Byrne,
supra note 17, at 255. Note, however, that defining a legal principle of "constitutional academic
freedom" in institutional terms is not the same thing as defining academic freedom generally, in
its nonlegal aspects, as a purely institutional right.
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academic freedom in purely institutional terms may obscure our understanding
of academic freedom as involving not only institutional rights against the
state, but also the rights of individual faculty members.26" ' More importantly,
one must keep in mind the distinction between academic freedom as a
general principle, and educational institutional autonomy as a legal principle,
because the nonlegal principle of academic freedom is deeply contested
within the academy itself.262 The academy has long debated the precise
meaning and purpose of academic freedom, just as it has long debated the
very purpose of higher education."'
That debate can have significant implications for any effort to consti-
tutionalize either some form of institutional autonomy for universities, or some
version of academic freedom, or both. One might conclude that if
academic freedom either no longer exists, or is so vague or contested a
value as to escape definition, then there is no sound basis for recognizing
it in any form as a "special concern of the First Amendment."2" So, for
example, Larry Alexander, in the course of arguing that "the topic of academic
freedom should be separated from that of freedom of speech,""26 contends
that the academy has become unmoored from classic conceptions of the
"responsibility [of professors] ... to act as academics. '2 6   "If academics are
functioning not as academics but as political advocates," he continues, "then
they do not merit academic freedom. If politics is the game, then politicians
representing the public have every right to enter it and call the shots. 267 In
short, to the extent that an argument for strong judicial deference to
universities, like the argument advanced here, is based on the benefits of this
261. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 259, at 849-51; see also Richard H. Hiers, Institutional
Academic Freedom-A Constitutional Misconception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuate the
Confusion?, 30 J.C. & U.L. 531 (2004) (criticizing arguments in favor of an institutional
understanding of constitutional academic freedom); Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of Proof and
Academic Freedom: Protection for Institution or Individual?, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 519-20
(1988) (arguing for primacy of individual academic freedom claims over institutional academic
freedom claims).
262. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 480-81; Timothy C. Shiell,
Three Conceptions of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE DAWN OF A NEW
CENTURY: HOW TERRORISM, GOVERNMENTS, AND CULTURE WARS IMPACT FREE SPEECH 17,
18 (Evan Gerstmann & Matthew J. Streb eds., 2006). See generally THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (Louis Menand ed., 1996); Stanley Fish, Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom, 35
VAL. U. L. REV. 499 (2001); David Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1377 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra).
263. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 279-81; Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24,
at 479-80.
264. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
265. Alexander, supra note 103, at 883.
266. Id. at 884.
267. Id.
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approach for academic freedom, one must ask how it is possible to ground
that approach on academic freedom when that very concept is shifting and
under attack, often from within the university itself.
Conversely, one might respond to the distinction between academic
freedom as a nonlegal value and academic freedom as a constitutionally
protected right, whether individual or institutional, by attempting to arrive
at a definitive view about the meaning of academic freedom and the
purpose of the university. One could then limit any legal protections for
universities or academics to those actions that meet this specific definition
of academic freedom. This seems to be Byrne's approach. Although Byrne,
like me, argues that "constitutional academic freedom cannot be violated by any
personnel decision based upon professional competence and taken by peers
in good faith, '26 his definition of constitutional academic freedom is bounded
by his views about "the indigenous values served by universities, 269 which he
defines as "the fundamental academic values of disinterested inquiry,
reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal education.""27 University actions
that do not serve these academic values may perforce fall outside the scope of
constitutional academic freedom protected by the First Amendment.
In thus seeking to limit the scope of institutional autonomy for universi-
ties under the First Amendment, Byrne surely has valid practical concerns.
As he has written, "[sleeking to protect aspects of autonomy removed from
[the fundamental values of the university] will fail and threaten to bring
the entire right [of constitutional academic freedom] into disrepute." ''
Similarly, he writes, "[plublic, including judicial, support for academic
freedom will wane when citizens no longer can perceive how it functions to
protect the important public interest in producing knowledge. 2
While I fully acknowledge the practical concerns raised by Byrne, I am
not convinced that they justify a response that effectively crystallizes a
particular definition of academic freedom in law, and then evaluates any
legal claims to autonomy made by universities on the basis of that
crystallized definition. My own view is that, rather than imposing a static
conception of academic freedom and the mission of the university when
defining the scope of constitutional educational autonomy for universities,
courts should be quite flexible. They should defer substantially to universities'
own sense of what their academic mission requires, and their own sense of
268. Byrne, supra note 17, at 306.
269. Id. at 333.
270. Id. at 338.
271. Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 939.
272. Id. at 952.
what academic freedom entails, rather than evaluate those claims against
a top-down, judicially imposed understanding of academic freedom.
Of course, most universities do share a common sense of academic
mission, one that dovetails with Byrne's own interest in "disinterested
inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal education." '273 Thus,
there may be less reason to worry, as Byrne does, that judges will lose faith
in the special role of universities under the First Amendment if they do not
have recourse to a specific traditional definition of academic freedom. But
some universities may indeed come to a different view of what academic
freedom requires, or of the mission of the university. For example, while
most universities may conclude that the university's sole or primary mission
is to encourage disinterested inquiry, others may conclude that their
mission equally involves inculcating a set of more or less specific democratic
values in its students or faculty. That understanding of the role of the
university might suggest, for some universities, that university speech that
falls outside the scope of this democratic mission should be subject to a greater
degree of regulation. Thus, some universities might argue that a democratic
understanding of the mission of the university justifies the imposition of
student speech codes that have been struck down under current law in both
public and private universities. 74 Similarly, religious universities might
have a different conception of their academic mission, and a correspond-
ingly different conception of what academic freedom entails on such
campuses, for both faculty and students.
Of course, we may sympathize or disagree with one or another of these
distinct conceptions of the university mission and of academic freedom.
Where we do, there is room for the exercise of both "voice" and "exit"
within the broader academic community.27 That is, we may publicly
question whether such universities are right to govern themselves according
to these norms, and we may choose to associate ourselves only with universities
that serve the academic values we hold dear.
But we should allow this conversation to take place at the level of the
institutions themselves, rather than limiting the legal principle of
educational autonomy only to those universities that comply with a narrow,
time-bound, and judicially imposed definition of the meaning of academic
freedom. That, after all, is ultimately part of what institutional autonomy
273. Byrne, supra note 17, at 338.
274. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 479-80; see also id. at 503-11.
275. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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entails, and it is certainly part of what we mean when we think of these
institutions as engaging in a genuinely shared act of constitutional interpreta-
tion.276 Indeed, in a broader sense, the very dialogue that I have suggested
should take place within and between universities about their educational
missions and about the meaning of academic freedom, and the diversity of
views that may arise within the larger family of universities, may ultimately
be far more productive of free speech values than a narrow and specific
conception of the scope of constitutional academic freedom would be. We
should be willing to let "a thousand flowers bloom.
2 77
Thus, in my view, courts should be reluctant to condition the
university's status as a First Amendment institution on a narrow definition
of academic freedom. Rather, they should allow universities considerable scope
to define the exercise of their autonomy according to their own sense of
academic mission. Again, however, we can at least acknowledge the complexity
of the relationship between the institutional approach to universities I have
advocated here, which focuses on the autonomy of universities, and the
somewhat distinct and contested concept of academic freedom itself.
C. Some Timely Applications
Having considered at length some of the easier and harder questions
raised by the institutional First Amendment approach to the university,
we might gain further traction in understanding this approach by examining
a few recent examples of legal controversies involving the university, and
considering what an institutional approach would have to say about each
of them.
An obvious place to begin is with the issue with which this Article
began: universities' use of race-conscious admissions processes, a position
that was given the Court's blessing-albeit a qualified blessing only27-- in Grutter
v. Bollinger.279 As I have written at length about this decision elsewhere,80 I will
add little more to that discussion here. Suffice it to say that the outcome in
Grutter would clearly be compelled by the institutional First Amendment
approach to universities, and indeed seems to be substantially underwritten by
276. See supra pp. 1513-14.
277. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 563.
278. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down as unconstitutional a race-conscious
admissions program for undergraduate applications to the University of Michigan on the grounds that
the university's consideration of undergraduate applicants was insufficiently individualized).
279. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
280. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24.
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precisely that approach. If "who may be admitted to study" is one of the
"essential freedoms" of a university,28' and if a university's desire to structure its
admissions so as to ensure a critical mass of students of various backgrounds
in the classroom is the product of a genuinely academic decision based on
that school's sense of what its academic mission requires, then courts should
defer substantially to that university's decision, allowing it an autonomous
space in which to select its students in light of its academic mission.
A more difficult question, perhaps, is whether a public university can
engage in race-conscious admissions where the state itself has said it cannot.
For example, can the State of Michigan, through a popular referendum,
prohibit the use of racial preferences in public university admissions within
the state, against the universities' own wishes ? 8 In declining to preliminarily
enjoin the operation of such a law, the Sixth Circuit recently suggested that
it can, concluding that while the First and Fourteenth Amendments "permit
States to use racial and gender preferences under narrowly defined
circumstances," they "do not mandate them, and accordingly.., do not
prohibit a State from eliminating them."2'8 In an analysis that he concedes
"may seem appalling" to some,285 Byrne concludes that constitutional
academic freedom means that state laws "that purport[] to deprive
universities of authority to consider race in admissions at all violate[] the
federal Constitution. ' 86
This conclusion surely follows from the arguments raised here in favor
of an institutional approach to universities under the First Amendment. Of
course, this case raises the question noted above: whether the First
Amendment should be understood to grant public universities rights against
the state. And given that the Michigan referendum is effectively a
statement by the people of Michigan about the desired scope of operation of
a university that they created and for which they supply public funding, the
question is put especially starkly here.
We might understand Byrne's argument, and mine, in these terms.
The people of the State of Michigan are entitled to rid themselves of the
University of Michigan and other state universities altogether if they so choose.
And they may well be free to vote to alter the nature and mission of those
281. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
282. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
283. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 239-40 (6th Cir.
2006) (discussing Michigan's passage in November 2006 of Proposal 2, a statewide ballot initiative
proposing to prohibit the use of racial preferences in public university admissions).
284. Id. at 240.
285. Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 938.
286. Id. at 937.
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universities so deeply that we would no longer recognize them as First
Amendment institutions entitled to autonomy as universities. To take an
extreme example, if the people voted to replace a university's usual functions
and turn the whole campus into a branch of the state Department of Motor
Vehicles, replacing classrooms and teachers with lineups, eye charts, and
petty bureaucrats processing applications for drivers' licenses, it would matter
little for purposes of that site's constitutional status that it happened still to
have the words "University of Michigan" engraved on its gates. So long as
the people have chosen to maintain the University of Michigan as a university,
however, they must stand by the bargain. At least as long as it is to retain
its constitutional value as a First Amendment institution, we should treat
even a public university as an entity that retains the full set of institutionally
oriented rights and privileges that mark it as a university. Thus, as shocking
as the outcome may be, an institutional approach to the university would
support Byrne's argument that a state that voluntarily maintains a public
university is not free to intrude upon its affairs in ways that fundamentally
interfere with the university's status as a self-governing institution.
Another current issue in academia worth examining has to do with
efforts in various states and in Congress to champion legislation known
generally as the Academic Bill of Rights."7 Although there are variations
in the content of the various versions of the Academic Bill of Rights that
have wended their way through different legislatures, certain core approaches
contained in these bills are especially worthy of notice. The bills state
generally that decisions of the university should not be made "on the basis
of... political or religious beliefs."2  That rule applies broadly to the
hiring, firing, tenure, or promotion of faculty; the composition of student
grades; the content of course curricula; and other university decisions.
289
If one takes the concerns of the proponents of the Academic Bill of
Rights at face value,29 such bills may seem unobjectionable. After all,,their
ostensible purpose is to guarantee the values of fairness, evenhandedness,
and disinterestedness that ought to appeal to any champion of the traditional
conception of academic freedom. To the extent that the Academic Bill of
287. For discussion of the Academic Bill of Rights, see Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment,
supra note 24, at 533-37; see also Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 939-46; Cheryl A.
Cameron et al., Academic Bills of Rights: Conflict in the Classroom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 243 (2005); Robert
M. O'Neil, Bias, "Balance," and Beyond: New Threats to Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV.
985 (2006).
288. Students for Academic Freedom, Academic Bill of Rights, http://cms.studentsforacademic
freedomorg (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
289. Id.; see also Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 942; O'Neil, supra note 287, at 999.
290. But see Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 534.
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Rights simply instantiates norms like "the pursuit of truth" or "pluralism,
diversity, opportunity, critical intelligence, openness and fairness," '291 then
surely the legislation serves, rather than detracts from, the purposes of
constitutional academic freedom.1
92
And yet, it is clear that under the institutional First Amendment
approach to the university that I have offered here, the Academic Bill of
Rights would be a nonstarter.2 93 For if the sort of institutional autonomy I
have argued the university must enjoy means anything, and if the idea of
judicial noninterference within the scope of university autonomy means
anything, it is precisely that the very questions to which the Academic Bill
of Rights supplies an imposed legislative answer-questions about the nature
and purpose of the university, the proper scope of a university's academic
mission, how a university should go about fulfilling that mission, whether a
university must remain ideologically neutral, the content of academic
freedom, and so on-are for the universities themselves to decide.
Again, it is likely that different universities might decide some or all of
these questions differently. One university might decide that its mission
involves the disinterested pursuit of truth, and that this requires rigidly
observed ideological neutrality in the classroom and in faculty hiring and
promotion. Another might decide that while ideological neutrality is required in
making personnel decisions, classrooms themselves cannot and should not
be micromanaged to ensure ideological neutrality. A third university might
decide that its mission requires it to make certain ideological commitments in
its personnel decisions and policies-if not base partisan commitments, then
perhaps a commitment to a particular value such as nondiscrimination, or a
commitment to a set of religious values in the case of a sectarian university.
Whatever the outcome of particular cases, the institutional approach to
universities requires that the debate over institutional mission be held by
individual universities, and that neither courts nor legislatures be given
jurisdiction to interfere with that debate. Thus, treating universities as
291. Students for Academic Freedom, supra note 288.
292. See Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 943 ("One might plausibly argue that the
[Academic Bill of Rights] could be implemented in a manner that would enhance rather than impair
academic freedom."); O'Neil, supra note 287, at 1005 (noting that some provisions of the Academic
Bill of Rights simply "invoke or recite" principles long recognized as central to academic freedom
by the American Association of University Professors).
293. Byrne and Robert O'Neil both agree with this proposition, whether on institutional or other
grounds. See Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 943-46; O'Neil, supra note 287, at 1015
("[Wihatever is done in this sensitive area must reflect the academic judgment of the
institution and its faculty, not the dictates of a state legislature or other governmental body, or
pressure from a private organization of alumni or others; any other approach ill serves the
interests of academic freedom.").
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First Amendment institutions would require courts to rule that measures
such as the Academic Bill of Rights are flatly unconstitutional. Given that
the Academic Bill of Rights at least purports to serve the interests of
academic freedom as that value is commonly understood, this outcome again
demonstrates that while educational institutional autonomy generally
serves academic freedom, it is not synonymous with it.
Finally, consider the Rumsfeld v. FAIR... case, which was decided last term
by the Supreme Court. In that case, the Court unanimously upheld the Solomon
Amendment, which effectively requires as a condition of universities' receipt of
federal funds that law schools, among other university actors, welcome
military recruiters to their campus on equal terms with other employers,
against a challenge brought by a variety of law schools and other plaintiffs.
The Court's decision seemed so straightforward and so consistent with existing
doctrine295 that the general response to the decision when it came down
was a sense of incredulity that any reasonable collection of law professors
could ever have imagined that the Court would reach a different result.29
6
I do want to imagine otherwise, however. This is not the place for an
extended critique of FAIR.297 But what is striking about the Court's opinion
in this case is its failure to confront fully what this Article has argued is a
central feature of any approach to constitutional law (including the Court's
current approach) that attempts to negotiate some space for institutional context
in the face of the urge toward acontextuality-namely, deference. Three
sorts of deference were potentially at issue in FAIR: deference to the
military, or to congressional decisions involving the regulation of military
affairs; deference to expressive associations (or Dale deference29
9 ), and
Grutter deference-the kind of deference to a university as a First Amendment
institution that has been the subject of this Article. The Court gave great
weight, at least implicitly, to the first category of deference.2" It paid lip service,
at best, to the notion of Dale deference.3"' But deference to the academic
judgment of universities as largely autonomous institutions, an approach that
294. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
295. But see Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO Sup. Cr. REV. 217- (suggesting
that the Court's opinion was-well, read the title); Chemerinsky, Why the Court Was Wrong, supra
note 205 (criticizing the decision in FAIR); Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 26 (arguing that
the Court's superficially reasonable opinion in FAIR obscures a variety of difficult questions
about its application of existing First Amendment doctrine).
296. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Law Schools Told to Allow Military Recruiters, 5 A.B.A.
J. REP. 10 (2006).
297. For that critique, see Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 26.
298. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
299. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 58-59.
300. See id. at 68-70.
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had been so strongly relied upon by a majority of the Court less than three
years earlier in Grutter, was basically ignored by the Court altogether,
without explanation.
A robust First Amendment institutional approach to the university might,
or might not, have reached a similar bottom-line outcome in the case, but it
surely would have produced an opinion that read very differently. Under the
institutional approach, courts would be obliged to defer substantially to a
law school's assertion that its desire to exclude military recruiters from
campus, or to grant them something less than absolutely equal access, was
compelled by its own sense of its academic mission, and that compliance with the
Solomon Amendment would do serious violence to that academic mission.
Under a strong-form institutional approach, that assertion might well be all that
would be required to defeat the government's own interest in placing military
recruiters on campus. Even under a weaker approach, the presumption in favor
of educational institutional autonomy, in cases that go to the core of what
the university asserts is its own academic mission, might well outweigh the
admittedly significant competing government interests at stake in the case. To
be sure, one might reasonably doubt that law schools actually care that
much about on-campus recruiting as an educational matter. 1 It seems
likely that this was the Court's implicit judgment as well.02 But an
institutional First Amendment approach to the case would have left that
judgment for the law schools themselves to make in the first instance. 03
301. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 525 n.312.
302. See, e.g., FAIR, 547 U.S. at 61-62, 69-70.
303. In a recent article, Byrne, who surely is no champion of the Solomon Amendment itself, argues
that the plaintiffs in FAIR nevertheless engaged in a "misguided" and "unpersuasive" "effort to 'stretch'
institutional academic freedom beyond the breaking point." Byrne, After Grutter, supra note 122, at 948.
See generay id. at 946-53. Byrne's arguments are eminently reasonable, and as the discussion below
indicates, I might well agree with his views if the question were abstracted from the matter of who is to
make such decisions. I think it is precisely there that our differences lie, however. Recall that Byrne
advocates limiting the scope of institutional autonomy by linking it to a particular definition of what
academic freedom entails--a definition that leaves on-campus recruiting outside the scope of constitu-
tional protection. See id. By contrast, I have argued that courts should avoid enforcing through law a
particularized definition of academic freedom, and instead should leave individual universities free to arrive
at their own understanding of what their academic mission requires. Under this approach, it is at least
imaginable that a law school might conclude that its mission did involve on-campus recruiting, and thus
might conclude that its conception of that mission required the exclusion of military recruiters. Cf. id. at
949 (noting that professional schools might have appropriate "normative commitments" to values such
as nondiscrimination, which might counsel in favor of excluding military recruiters, but arguing
that such norms are not shielded, under his definition of academic freedom, "from displacement by
other civil norms" through law). Of course, as I make clear below, to say that a law school might
conclude that its academic mission required excluding military recruiters, and that courts should
defer to the school's wishes on this point, is not to say that we should not argue, outside the courts, over
whether the law schools are acting correctly as academic institutions when they assert such a right.
Universities as First Amendment Institutions
That is not the end of the matter, however. For, as I have argued, the
institutional First Amendment approach to the university is not simply a matter
of unconditional license. Deference to an institution carries with it responsibili-
ties as well as rights for the deferred-to institution."4 In particular, deference to
universities as First Amendment institutions carries with it a corresponding
obligation on the part of the university to exercise its autonomy in a way that is
consistent with the deeper values of that institution. If we are willing to grant
universities substantial autonomy as First Amendment institutions, it is largely
because we trust and expect that they will seriously consider just what their own
sense of their academic mission entails and act accordingly, within the best
traditions of those institutions. We may conclude that those expectations should
be enforced from within the academic community rather than by the courts,
but we expect it nevertheless.
Of course, it is possible that the law school plaintiffs in FAIR genuinely
believed that their academic missions would be endangered by the presence of
military recruiters on campus, and that their missions thus required them to
exclude those recruiters. And certainly, if the law schools were willing to make
such an assertion, the institutional approach would require courts to defer
to such assertions rather than second-guess them. But one might reasonably
suspect that some of these institutions, at least, did not believe that their
academic missions really required any such thing, or that they simply had not
given much thought to the question. 5 Although the FAIR litigation made it
expedient for the schools to describe their desire to exclude military recruiters
in terms of academic mission, it is possible that at least some of the schools
304. See generally Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 26. See also Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment,
supra note 24, at 580-81.
305. One might also suspect that at least some law schools have abdicated their responsibility to
decide such questions for themselves, and instead have simply surrendered to the hard or soft coercions of
other organizations, such as the American Association of Law Schools (AALS), whose policies
require member schools not to permit discrimination on campus. This point is beyond the scope of
this Article. But it does suggest that law schools, other faculties, and universities as a whole have
an obligation, if they are to enjoy the autonomy to pursue their academic missions that I have
argued for here, to resist undue efforts on the part of accreditation agencies and other centralized bodies to
impose particular academic missions and policies on their members; and those bodies should in
turn be careful to leave space for their members to pursue reasonable understandings of their own
academic missions rather than impose ideologically based requirements on member schools. Cf.
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 530 n.331 (quoting a memorandum from Mark
Tushnet, then president of the AALS, in which he asks of the Solomon Amendment, "how can the
Association assert that its member schools have made academic freedom judgments [to bar on-
campus military recruiters] when the policies at issue were adopted because of pressure from the
Association, not because of member schools' own reflection on their missions?").
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had no real academic interest in doing so, or at least failed to "engage in any
act of reasoned elaboration" on this question . 6
One might go further and suspect that, for some of these institutions,
their own sense of academic mission might actually cut against such a
conclusion. For example, their understanding of their academic mission
might generally counsel in favor of the value of permitting a wide diversity
of viewpoints and arguments on the law school campus, or permit the
presence of student groups or legal clinics whose own policies were in some
way exclusionary. In such circumstances, one might reasonably question
the good faith of any such institution that then sought to argue,
notwithstanding a general policy of welcoming others on campus despite
their discriminatory views or policies, that it was acting within its academic
mission when they sought to exclude military recruiters. Similarly, one
might ask whether a law school that sought to exclude the military on the
grounds that its policies violated the school's academic mission of
nondiscrimination should be equally obliged to restrict recruitment efforts
by members of Congress, which is ultimately responsible for the military's
policies, or to expel private employers if it reasonably believed that those
employers failed to hire a diverse group of students.
In short, we must acknowledge that as to at least some of the plaintiffs
in FAIR, a due consideration of their own sense of their academic mission,
and their own sense of what academic freedom required for them as
university departments, taken as a whole, might have compelled the
conclusion that they could not require the expulsion of military recruiters
consistently with their own understanding of their mission. Of course, they
were entitled to reach a contrary conclusion, and my position suggests that
the courts were not entitled to second-guess them. But as fellow members
of the academic community, we are fully entitled, if not obliged, to do so.
In short, under the institutional First Amendment approach to the
university, the Court was far too quick to dismiss the law schools' case in
FAIR. But it is also possible that the law schools were far too quick to bring
the case. The institutional approach I have argued for here demands that
law schools and other entities fully consider, and then make every effort to
live consistently with, their own sense of their academic mission, rather
than use deference as a mere tool to achieve nonacademic goals. It is, of
course, possible that the law schools involved in the FAIR litigation, or at least
some of them, lived up to that obligation; but we are entitled to some
reasonable suspicion on this point. If that suspicion is justified, we are left
306. Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D. Mass. 1998).
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with the conclusion that the law schools ought, perhaps, to have won the
day in FAIR-and also, perhaps, ought never to have brought the litigation
in the first place.
CONCLUSION
I close with the hope that the institutional approach to the First
Amendment I have advanced here will find a willing audience beyond the
community of scholars who are interested in the constitutional status of
the university alone, and indeed beyond the broad community of First
Amendment scholars. As I have argued, constitutional law as a whole faces
a tension: It is caught between the law's desire to define itself acontextually
according to formal legal categories, and its competing need to recognize
the myriad factual and institutional contexts in which human activity
actually takes place." 7 As the other articles in this issue make clear, this
dilemma is present in a variety of guises throughout the body of constitu-
tional law. The institutional approach I have advocated here is one way of
resolving this tension, and it should thus be of interest to constitutional
scholarship generally.
Indeed, we might see the institutional approach to universities and
other entities that occupy "special niche[s] '"3 ' within the First Amendment
as one that finds its echoes elsewhere in contemporary currents in constitu-
tional scholarship. For example, the institutional approach is in some ways
a close relative of the call by a number of scholars, including most prominently
Michael Doff and Charles Sabel, for an "experimentalist" approach to
constitutional law that would "accord a variety of local institutions substantial
latitude 'for experimental elaboration and revision [of their activities] to
accommodate varied and changing circumstances."' 3 Under this approach,
courts would "devolve[e] deliberate authority for fully specifying norms to
local actors, ' rather than simply "laying down specific rules" to guide
those actors.3" The institutional approach obviously is sympathetic to, and
may be part of, such an approach to constitutional law.
307. See generally Schauer, Institutions, supra note 232.
308. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
309. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 24, at 575 (quoting Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 283 (1998)).
310. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
978 (2003).
311. Id. at 961.
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From a still broader perspective, the institutional approach may ultimately
be related to the recent effort by a variety of scholars to explore the gap
between constitutional meaning and constitutional implementation.312  This
literature argues that "a gap can exist between the meaning of constitutional
guarantees, on the one hand, and judicially enforceable rights, on the other." '
Thus, "we should understand the Supreme Court's role" not in terms of "a
search for the Constitution's one true meaning," but "as a more multifaceted
one of 'implementing' constitutional norms."3"4 As Richard Fallon notes,
much remains to be done in exploring implementation as a central subject
of constitutional law, especially at the operational level. '5 This Article
explores one important device for constitutional implementation by courts-
the use of deference as a means of opening up a space for shared constitutional
interpretation by autonomous actors such as universities.3 6
It is thus clear that this discussion should not be of interest to scholars of
the university, or of the First Amendment, alone. Although the university
is indeed one important subject of the First Amendment institutional
approach, the institutional approach is ultimately part of a broader discussion
in constitutional law. It offers a way of understanding our Constitution that
resists the lure of acontextuality in constitutional interpretation, and instead
is responsive to the call of those institutions that play a vital role in the
Constitution as we experience it in real life.
312. See Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 220, 220 (2006) (noting that the last ten years have "witnessed a steady increase in
scholarly attention to the meaning/doctrine distinction").
313. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1276 (2006).
314. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001).
315. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 313, at 1321 ("Frank recognition of the judicial function in
crafting and choosing among judicially manageable standards triggers questions about judicial
power and competence that have not received much helpful study.... Questions about the
empirical predicates for constitutional analysis cry out for further examination."); id. at 1322,
1331 (arguing that the notion of a meaning-implementation gap in constitutional law "furnishes
an agenda" for further academic work, and suggesting some possible lines of inquiry).
316. For more on this point, see Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 26. In arguing that courts
should evaluate academic freedom claims by universities according to "their germaneness to the
university's central academic mission," Alan Chen similarly sees a connection to Richard Fallon's
work on constitutional implementation. See Chen, supra note 17, at 973-75.
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